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The Liberty to Spy
Asaf Lubin*
Many, if not most, international legal scholars share the ominous contention that espionage, as a legal
field, is devoid of meaning. For them, any attempt to extrapolate the lex lata corpus of the International
Law of Intelligence (ILI), let alone its lex scripta, would inevitably prove to be a failed attempt, as there
is simply nothing to extrapolate. The notion that international law is moot as to the question of if, when,
and how intelligence is to be collected, analyzed, and promulgated, has been repeated so many times that it
has become the prevailing orthodoxy.
This paper offers a new and innovative legal framework for articulating the law and practice of
interstate peacetime espionage operations, relying on a body of moral philosophy and intelligence ethics thus
far ignored by legal thinkers. This framework diagnoses the legality of covert intelligence at three distinct
temporal stages: before, during, and after. In doing so it follows the traditional paradigms of interna-
tional law and the use of force, which themselves are grounded in the history of Just War Theory.
Adopting the Jus Ad, Jus In, Jus Post model is appropriate, given the symbiosis between espionage and
fundamental U.N. Charter principles.
This paper focuses on the first of these three paradigms, the Jus Ad Explorationem (“JAE”), a sover-
eign’s prerogative to engage in peacetime espionage and the right’s core limitations. Examining a plethora
of international legal sources, the paper exemplifies the myriad ways by which peacetime intelligence
gathering has been already recognized as a necessary pre-requisite for the functioning of our global legal
order. The paper then discusses the nature of the JAE. It argues that the right to spy is best understood as a
privilege in Hohfeldian terms. It shows how understanding interstate intelligence operations as a weaker
“liberty right” that imposes no obligations on third parties to tolerate such behavior helps capture the
essence of the customary norms that form part of the practice.
Recognizing the liberty right to spy opens the door for the doctrine of “abuse of rights” to play a role in
constraining the practice. By identifying the only two legitimate justifications for peacetime espionage—
advancing the national security interests of States and promoting an increase in international stability
and cooperation—we are able to delimit what may constitute abusive spying, defined as exploiting one’s
right to spy not for the purposes for which the right was intended. The paper concludes by introducing four
categories of unlawful espionage: (1) spying as a means to advance personal interests; (2) spying as a
means to commit internationally wrongful acts; (3) spying as a means to advance corporate interests; and
(4) spying as a means to exploit post-colonial relations.
Introduction
Thomas Middleton’s satirical play, A Game at Chess,1 was first performed
in August 1624 in the Shakespearean Globe Theater and had “an unprece-
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dented run, the longest on the Jacobean stage.”2 Filtered through the alle-
gory of a chess match, it offered a political commentary to the prevailing
tensions between the royal houses of Spain and Great Britain. It was a period
of civic life considered by some to be the “golden age of espionage, when
Europe appeared to be fairly crawling with spies.”3 The European Wars of
Religion were what triggered this lavish expansion in spycraft.4 The Protes-
tant Reformation movement and the Counter-Reformation Catholic crusade
turned Europe into a “maelstrom of entities warring over religion” which
brought with it a “constant danger that put a premium on intelligence.”5
The Westphalian legal order that emerged at the end of the Thirty Years’
War—and which was established on the principles of sovereign equality and
non-intervention—was thus an order extremely cognizant of and susceptible
to the moral debauchery of interstate intelligence gathering. The intricate
webs of spies that was weaved over Europe at that time period simultane-
ously helped shape Westphalia and were shaped by it.
The intelligence profession, the shadowy work of spooks and saboteurs
operating in disguise, played a critical role in maintaining the 17th cen-
tury’s balance of power and has continued to do so over the centuries.6 From
the days of Sir Francis Walsingham, the father of modern intelligence agen-
cies and the first spymaster to manage an omnipresent mass surveillance
program across the European continent, all the way to the Trump-Russia
dossier produced by former MI6 agent Christopher Steele, intelligence seems
to guide world politics. Espionage plays such a cardinal role in both our
domestic affairs and foreign policies that one would have presumed there to
be well-established rules of international law undergirded by a vibrant aca-
demic exchange and jurisprudential debate surrounding the ways by which
intelligence is to be ordered, collected, analyzed, and disseminated. Instead,
as noted by Chesterman, intelligence exits in a “legal penumbra, lying at
2. Thomas Cogswell, Thomas Middleton and the Court 1624: A Game at Chess in Context, 47 Hunting-
ton Libr. Q. 273, 273 (1984).
3. Ernest Volkman, The History of Espionage: The Clandestine World of Surveillance,
Spying and Intelligence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 World 58 (2007).
4. Id. Chesterman cites Garrett Mattingly to suggest that espionage is grounded in modern diplomacy
as it evolved from the Renaissance through the post-Westphalian legal order. He explains that “a chief
function of the resident ambassador soon became to ensure that ‘a continuous stream of foreign political
news flow[ed] to his home government’.” See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War:
Intelligence and International Law, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1071, 1087 (2006) (citing Garrett Mattingly,
Renaissance Diplomacy 67 (1955)).
5. See Volkman, supra note 3, at 58. R
6. Hungarian adventurer and former spy Ignatius Trebitsch-Lincoln describes the role intelligence
played in maintaining the European balance of power: “[w]hen Kaiser William II meets the Tzar of all
the Russias, it is France, England, and Turkey who must penetrate the veil of the secret conclaves. When
Edward VII meets Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister at Marienbard, the secret intelligence depart-
ments of Germany and Austria must watch for shadows on the political map of Europe. When England
and France sign an entente cordiale, the starting point for new negotiations between these powers and
Russia, the men from Wilhelmstrasse have already forecasted this eventuality. Such things hidden from
the eyes of the plodding citizen in his complacent world are the momentous problems of the diplomatic
spy.” Ignatius Timothy Trebitsch-Lincoln, Revelations of an International Spy 40 (1916).
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the margins of diverse legal regimes and at the edge of international
legitimacy.”7
This should come as no surprise to those who have mastered the arts of
“the second oldest profession.”8 The literature surrounding the international
law of espionage has been historically stagnant, coalescing around three con-
tradictory accounts, with three different conclusions as to the legality of
spying: “legal,” “illegal,” or “neither legal nor illegal.”9 Take, for example,
Essays on Espionage and International Law, a compilation of reaction papers
produced for the 1961 regional meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law (“ASIL”). The articles cover the commentaries of a number of
prominent legal scholars to both the U2 spy plane incident of 1960 and the
American program of early warning reconnaissance satellites (the Missile
Defense Alarm System, “MIDAS”). Whereas Julius Stone took a permis-
sivist point of view (suggesting that we live in a “system of reciprocally
tolerated espionage”), Quincy Wright adopted a prohibitionist theory (con-
sidering espionage as a form of “illegal intervention”), and Richard Falk
seemed closest to the extralegalist camp (concluding that “it is probably not
useful to debate the legality” of espionage in traditional international law).10
It is only quite recently that we have witnessed a gradual shift from these
old-school absolutist theories to new-school thinkers who have centered
their research on a relativist model of espionage law, suggesting rather that
7. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1130; see also David Silver, Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in Na- R
tional Security Law 935, 965 (John Norton Moore & Robert Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005) (“There is
something almost oxymoronic about addressing the legality of espionage under international law.”).
8. Michael J. Barrett, Honorable Espionage, J. Def. & Dipl., Feb. 1984, at 13, 14 (“Espionage is the
world’s second oldest profession and just as honorable as the first.”).
9. For literature that splits the law on espionage into these three camps, or a similar version of them,
see John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 595, 602
(2007); Peyton Cooke, Bringing the Spies from the Cold: Legal Cosmopolitanism and Intelligence Under the Laws
of War, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 601, 609-10 (2010); Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveil-
lance, 55 Va. J. Int’l L. 291, 300–13 (2015); Captain M. E. Bowman, Intelligence and International Law, 8
Int’l J. Intelligence & Counterintelligence 321, 328 (1995); cf. Craig Forcese, Pragmatism and
Principle: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 Va. L. Rev. 67, 68 (2016) (after citing Radsan’s
partitioning of “academic commentaries on the topic into three categories,” Forcese notes that a fourth
category exists, one which “subdivides the world of intelligence collection into constituent state acts . . .
examin[ing] law governing specific conduct.” Forcese places himself and Inñaki Navarrete in this camp).
10. Quincy Wright et al., Essays on Espionage and International Law (Roland J. Stranger
ed., 1962). Stone did distinguish between spying that serves a “destructive . . . green-light function”
which should be limited, and a “salutary red-light function” which should be embraced. Nonetheless, he
left open the question of how to regulate against the green-light function. See Julius Stone, Legal Problems
of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, supra, at 29, 42-43 (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962). Quincy
Wright saw espionage as a form of “illegal intervention” to be condemned and argued further that where
it occurs it should be dealt with through means of collective action. Quincy Wright, Espionage and the
Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, supra, at 3, 23-26 (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962). Falk
argued that espionage possesses “the peculiar quality of being tolerated but illegal.” Falk simultaneously
argued, however, that from a policy perspective the destabilizing nature of espionage challenges the
rationality of any of the justifications raised in favor of it. Richard A. Falk, Space Espionage and World
Order: A Consideration of the Samos-Midas Program, supra, at 45, 57, 68, 74-75 (Roland J. Stranger ed.,
1962).
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the practice is sometimes legal and sometimes illegal.11 These emerging
voices take the strong view that while peacetime espionage “does not per se
violate international law, the method by which it is carried out might do
so.”12 In their literature, these scholars have thus attempted to draw legal
distinctions between different types of intelligence gathering activities and
techniques, focusing mainly on questions of territoriality. For example, as
the International Group of Experts (“IGE”) who drafted Tallinn Manual 2.0
recently put forward, an agent of State A who covertly enters State B and
while physically present on its territory uses a USB flash drive to introduce
certain spyware into that country’s infrastructure, will be in violation of the
U.N. Charter principle of territorial sovereignty and therefore violates inter-
national law.13 That would not be true, argues the IGE, if the espionage was
instead carried out through remote sensing from a satellite in outer space, or
through the interception of those communications that, due to the nature of
the Internet, just happen to cross into the surveilling state’s territory.
The legal discourse has thus far overwhelmingly ignored a body of moral
philosophy and intelligence ethics literature that has long suggested that
rules on spying may be identified by considering a different set of lenses
altogether. In explaining the practice of intelligence and the moral founda-
tions that reinforce it, these philosophers have adopted an approach that
maneuvers through espionage’s great “wilderness of mirrors”14 by following
a normative diagnosis of intelligence operations at three distinct temporal
stages: before, during, and after. In so doing, these writers adopt the tradi-
tional paradigms of international law and the use of force, which are them-
selves grounded in the history of Just War Theory (“JWT”). Using the Jus
Ad, Jus In, Jus Post models for intelligence regulation is appropriate given
the symbiosis between espionage, fundamental Charter principles, and con-
trol over international violence. As Darrell Cole notes, the just war criteria
offer intelligence agencies readily available principles to be internalized as
“checks in extreme circumstances,” and thus “ought to be foundational for
the moral formation for any spy.”15
This article attempts to lay the foundation for the translation of these
moral accounts into a revolutionary lex specialis subfield of international law,
11. See, e.g., Jared Beim, Enforcing a Prohibition on International Espionage, 18 Chi. J. Int’l L. 647, 656
(2018) (suggesting that “all espionage is not created equal” and that certain forms of espionage are “not
worth punishing” compared to others).
12. Tallinn Manual 2.0 On The International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 168
(Michael Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TM 2.0] (the International Group of Experts (“IGE”)
placed “peacetime cyber espionage” under Section 5, which covers those cyber operations that the IGE
deemed to be “not per se regulated by international law”). For a critique of TM 2.0, particularly the
“loose relationship between the Tallinn Rules and post-Tallinn state practice,” see Dan Efrony & Yuval
Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112
Am. J. Int’l. L. 583 (2018).
13. TM 2.0, supra note 12, at 19. R
14. See David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors 10 (1980).
15. Darrell Cole, Just War and the Ethics of Espionage 151 (2014).
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what I call the International Law of Intelligence (“ILI”). While opposing
both old-school and new-school scholarship, this articulation of the ILI
maintains a clear-eyed view of the important functions that intelligence
plays in our legal world order, framing these functions within a larger global
constitutive process. This paper seeks to learn from mistakes made in previ-
ous academic endeavors, which either erred by over-emphasizing the myth
system or over-simplifying the operational code of spycraft.16 Ultimately,
the paper reaches the conclusion that states enjoy a peacetime right to spy
under international law, that the existence of the right is essential for the
functioning of our public world order, and that only by acknowledging the
right may we be able to articulate when the right is abused.
As such, this article focuses only on the first of the three paradigms that
comprise the ILI: the Jus Ad Explorationem (“JAE”), a sovereign’s prerogative
to collect intelligence in peacetime and the right’s core limitations. After
mapping the existing discourse and its discontents in Section II, the paper
moves to assert the controversial claim that there exists in international law
a “right to spy.” To prove this point, Part II analyzes a plethora of interna-
tional legal sources including states’ rights to survival, self-defense, and self-
determination; collective security obligations under U.N. and treaty law;
international human rights law; and international humanitarian law. Ulti-
mately, this Part reaffirms what Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Reis-
man had argued some forty-five years ago, that “[t]he key to the
contemporary global security system is a reliable and unremitting flow of
intelligence to the pinnacle elites.”17 In the absence of centralized suprana-
16. As Professor W. Michael Reisman noted “in law things are not always what they seem,” and one
needs to be particularly mindful of the existence of “two ‘relevant’ normative systems: one which is
supposed to apply and which continues to enjoy lip service among elites [which he calls the myth
system] and one which is actually applied [which he calls the operational code].” Reisman describes the
tension between the myth and the code as a “dynamic process” and a “symbiotic relationship.” See W.
Michael Reisman, On the Causes of Uncertainty and Volatility in International Law, in The Shifting Allo-
cation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Sub-
sidiarity 33, 44-45 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008) (“[T]he myth system is not widely
appreciated as consciously false. It does not express values that are obsolete. On the contrary: it affirms
values that continue to be important socially and personally. Although not applied in the ‘jurisdiction’ of
the operational code, the myth system may yet influence decision-making. Precisely because discrepan-
cies between myth system and operational code can erode the credibility of the myth system, mainte-
nance of belief in the myth system is a dynamic process requiring ongoing contributions from many. By
contrast, those who practise the operational code try to obscure it from the general public. But there is an
almost symbiotic relationship between myth system and operational code, with the latter providing a
degree of suppleness and practicality that the myth system could not achieve without changing much of
its content and procedure of application.”).
17. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The Intelligence Function and
World Public Order, 46 Temp. L.Q. 365, 434 (1973). The article, which was republished in International
Law Essays in 1981, is one of the oldest and most comprehensive studies of the subject of intelligence
collection and processing under the post-UN world order. The authors provide an original New Haven
School account of the international law that governs intelligence activities. They predominantly focus on
what they envision as the way forward for the evolution of the practice, or in their words: “If the policies
affecting the constitutive structure and functions of the world community are to move toward the realiza-
tion of at least minimum public order, the intelligence component of the decision process must harmo-
nize as far as possible with criteria designed to provide the pertinent flow of communicated messages to
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tional enforcement mechanisms, of hierarchal global structures or well-de-
fined international prescriptive processes, states depend on such intelligence
collection and analysis to monitor and divert potential threats and imperil-
ments as well as to maximize their own relative power.18 Lacking a world
“Interspy” (“a service that draws upon the sources available to all organiza-
tions willing and able to work together to expose threats to world public
order”),19 international institutions rely almost entirely on intelligence pro-
duced by their member states to fulfill their mandate.20 In other words, the
gathering of intelligence is a necessary pre-requisite for the functioning of
our broader legal order. This reality suggests that states enjoy a derivative
right, and indeed under certain circumstances even an obligation, to contin-
uously engage in peacetime espionage to achieve certain communal goals.
Part III shifts the discussion to the nature of the JAE. I contend that the
right to spy is best understood not as a hard claim-right, but rather as a
weaker privilege, borrowing from Hohfeld’s Theory of Rights and Duties. I
explain how conceptualizing interstate intelligence gathering as a liberty
that imposes no obligations on third parties to tolerate such behavior when
done unto them helps capture the essence of the customary norms that form
part of the practice.21
all who participate in authoritative control.” Id. at 370-71. By focusing on the important functions that
intelligence play, they seem to adopt a pragmatic view, thereby rejecting interpretations of the prevailing
legal regimes in vacuum.
18. Former director-general of MI5, Sir Stephen Lander, argued that “intelligence services and intelli-
gence collection are at heart manifestations of individual state power and of national self-interest.” Sir
Stephen Lander, International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective, 17 Cambridge Rev. Int’l Aff.
481, 481 (2004). See also Jennifer E. Sims, Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details, 19 Int’l J.
Intelligence & Counterintelligence 195, 196 (2006); Don Munton, Intelligence Cooperation Meets
International Studies Theory: Explaining Canadian Operations in Castro’s Cuba, 24 Intelligence & Nat’l
Sec. 119, 126-28 (2009).
19. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 17, at 447; see also James L. Tyron, International Organ- R
ization and Police, 25 Yale L.J. 34, 34 (1916) (making the case for an “international army and navy”
suggesting that such an idea “is one of the oldest and most persistent ideas associated with the move-
ment for world peace”).
20. See, e.g., Bassey Ekpe, The Intelligence Assets of the United Nations: Sources, Methods, and Implications,
20 Int’l J. Intelligence & Counterintelligence 377, 378-79 (2007) (“The assumption is that
members of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, in their daily proceedings, come
equipped with a wealth of knowledge on specific or emerging issues, provided to them by their national
intelligence services or other forms of specialized information and analysis departments.”); Guido Ven-
turoni, The Washington Summit Initiatives: Giving NATO the “Tools” to do its Job in the Next Century, 47
NATO Rev. 8, 11 (1999) (“In the area of intelligence gathering, NATO—which has few intelligence
assets of its own and is already dependent on its member nations for intelligence contributions—must
solicit its members for considerably more input than previously.”); Office of Tech. Assessment
(“OTA”), Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, United States Congress, 5
(1995), https://perma.cc/GH3R-K4F3 [hereinafter OTA Report] (discussing the IAEA’s limited investi-
gative ability to discover undeclared activities that states wish to keep hidden and its dependency on its
members’ intelligence capacities).
21. In doing so, this Section further challenges our existing perceptions of the Lotus doctrine. S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). The Lotus Principle,
commonly cited as a foundational principle of international law, assumes that lawfulness on the interna-
tional plain is derived from the absence of a prohibition. It runs in opposition to democratic and adminis-
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 7 18-FEB-20 12:03
2020 / The Liberty to Spy 191
Part IV ends by drawing the limits of the JAE. Acknowledging the exis-
tence of a liberty right to spy is important, as it allows us to begin sketching
the justifications for spying and thereby articulating the limits of the prac-
tice—those cases in which the right may be abused by a country spying for
illegitimate purposes. Relying on the abuse of rights doctrine as a general
principle of international law, this Section identifies four such categories of
abusive spying: (1) spying as a means to advance personal interests; (2) spy-
ing as a means to commit an internationally wrongful act; (3) spying as a
means to advance corporate interests; and (4) spying as a means to exploit
post-colonial relations.
I. The Faultlines of the Existing Discourse
A. Defining Espionage
As a preliminary matter, my choice of terminology should be clarified. I
use the nouns “espionage,” “intelligence,” “surveillance,” and “reconnais-
sance” (and their associated verbs, “to spy,” “to surveil,” “to monitor”)
interchangeably throughout this paper. While it is true that some of these
words may have been traditionally used to refer to specific methods of intel-
ligence collection,22 they are all elements of spycraft and should thus be
understood as forming part of a collective whole.
It is further worth noting that under customary international law there is
no “internationally recognized and workable definition of ‘intelligence col-
lection.’” 23 There seems to be almost as many definitions of intelligence as
there are experts asked to define it.24 For the purposes of this paper I settle
on the following self-crafted definition:25
trative rule of law systems that require, through a principle of legality, that state agencies possess
statutory authorization prior to taking an action.
22. For example, Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “espionage” as “the practice of spying or using
spies to obtain information about the plans and activities especially of a foreign government or a compet-
ing company.” The focus on “spies” might be perceived as associated with HUMINT collection activi-
ties. On the other hand, the term “reconnaissance” is defined as “a preliminary survey to gain
information, especially an exploratory military survey of enemy territory.” The focus on “military
surveys” might denote different forms of VISINT exercises and SIGINT collection (in particular different
types of electronic intelligence gathering, or ELINT). For the definitions of HUMINT, SIGINT, and
VISINT, see infra note 29; see also Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy R
88 (6th ed. 2015) (distinguishing between “surveillance,” which he defines as the “systematic observa-
tion of a targeted area or group, usually for an extended period of time; “reconnaissance,” defined as “a
mission to acquire information about a target, sometimes meaning a one-time endeavor;” and “intelli-
gence,” defined as “a general term for collection”).
23. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law, 28
Mich. J. Int’l L. 625, 637 (2006).
24. See Michael Warner, Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”, 46 Stud. Intelligence 15, 15 (2002)
(suggesting that the term intelligence is “defined anew by each author who addresses it” and that so far
“no one has succeeded in crafting a theory of intelligence”).
25. The definition mirrors in some respects, and departs in others, from the definition put forward in
Geoffrey Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 Denver J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y 321, 325-26 (1996)
(“[E]spionage can be defined as the consciously deceitful collection of information ordered by a govern-
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 8 18-FEB-20 12:03
192 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 61
Intelligence operations (“IOs”) are those operations that encompass all five of the
following components
(1) The operation occurs in peacetime
(2) The operation involves the passive gathering, analysis, verification,
and dissemination of information of relevance to a State or States’ “deci-
sion-making process” and in service of some State interests.
(3) The operation is launched by agents of a State or States, or those
with a sufficient nexus to the State or States in question (the Surveilling
State(s)).
(4) The operation targets a foreign State or States, their subjects, as-
sociations, corporations, or agents, without that State or States’ knowledge
or consent (the Target State(s)).
(5) The operation involves some degree of secrecy and confidentiality, as
to both the needs behind the operation and the specific methods of collection
and analysis employed, so to ensure its effectiveness. These cape et d’épée
(cloak and dagger) operations, would often be coupled with some degree of
deceitful intent on the part of the Surveilling State(s), though such is not
always mandated.26
A few observations emerge from examining this definition. Most impor-
tantly, the definition excludes many areas of government work that some
might conceive of as falling under the broad umbrella of “espionage” as it is
understood in popular media. Namely, I do not seek, or intend to address,
the legality of covert action, influence operations, offensive cyber intrusions,
election interferences, information warfare or assassinations, if to name but a
few examples.27 The right to spy as proposed in the following pages is an
extremely narrow right and should thus not be confused with some mon-
strous Jus Extra Bellum –a kind of state right to engage in all national secur-
ity activities that are below the threshold of armed conflict.28
ment or organization hostile to or suspicious of those the information concerns, accomplished by humans
unauthorized by the target to do the collecting.”), and another put forward in Raphael Bitton, The
Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations, 29 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1009, 1011 (2014) (“[E]spionage between
states is . . . an undercover state-sponsored intrusion into the restricted space of another state or organiza-
tion for the sake of collecting information.”).
26. Each of the underlined terms in this definition requires unpacking that is impossible to do within
the limits of this article. At the heart of my attempts to capture a definitional structure for intelligence
operations, stands a desire to offer a narrow definition. This is because, as some commentators have noted:
“most definitions of espionage and intelligence are so broad as to allow us to define even a local town
library as intelligence.” Jeffrey Burds, The Second Oldest Profession: A World History of
Espionage - Part One 8 (2011).
27. For legal analysis of covert action and related activities, see W. Michael Reisman & James E.
Baker, Regulating Covert Action: Practices, Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion
in International and American Law (1992); Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert
Operations, 86 Am. J. Int’l. L. 284, 305 (1992); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Legality of Covert Action under
Contemporary International Law, 1 La Raza L. J. 139, 166-167 (1984).
28. For further reading, see Michael Jefferson Adams, Jus Extra Bellum: Reconstructing the Ordinary,
Realistic Conditions of Peace, 5 Harv. Nat’l. Sec. J. 377 (2014).
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Moreover, this definition seeks to encompass all primary fields of intelli-
gence gathering (or INTs as they are known in traditional spy parlance),
including, human intelligence (“HUMINT”), signals intelligence
(“SIGINT”), and Visual Intelligence (“VISINT”).29 In fact even certain
forms of Open Source Intelligence (or “OSINT”) might be included, to the
extent that the collection involves secrecy surrounding both the goals of the
operation and the specific methods of collection. In this regard a diplomat
sitting in his embassy reading a local newspaper or engaging in the course of
regular diplomatic affairs should not be considered as engaging in an intelli-
gence operation, even if they are doing so in support of some confidential
objective. However, if that same diplomat relies on complex data mining
algorithms to secretly scrape the governmental websites of the host state,
this OSINT operation would fall under the definition, for both the algo-
rithms employed and the nature and goals of the operation itself would have
to be kept opaque.30
Finally, this definition focuses only on interstate and peacetime activities.
I exclude both domestic forms of surveillance (subject to ever-increasing
constitutional and administrative frameworks as well as international human
29. Human Intelligence Collection (“HUMINT”) refers to the process of gathering information from
human sources. HUMINT sources could be anyone. It may be “a foreign official who, by virtue of a
position of trust in his government has access to important information and who is willing, for some
reason, to pass it to officers of one’s intelligence service.” Abram N. Shulsky & Gary J. Schmitt,
Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 11 (2002). At the same time, it
may simply be a citizen of the surveilling state who has traveled abroad for study or who works in a
certain industry that puts her in direct contact with foreign persons of interests. Specialized Handlers
develop a profound mastery in human psychology, for “understanding people, with all of their complexi-
ties, is crucial to the business of running assets to collect HUMINT.” INTelligence: Human Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 21, 2010), https://perma.cc/CU85-FJH7. Collection methods
may include in-person meetings and debriefs, secret exchanges, and remote communications using so-
phisticated technological means. For further reading see Lowenthal, supra note 22, at 127-37. Signal R
Intelligence Collection (“SIGINT”) refers to the process of deriving intelligence from intercepted electro-
magnetic waves. It may be sub-divided further based on the systems emanating the waves intercepted:
Communication Intelligence (“COMINT”) covers that information that is derived from the interception
of communications signals (e.g. radio messages, telephonic communications, internet communications,
satellite communications); Electronic Communications (“ELINT”) covers that information derived from
non-communication electromagnetic radiations, such as from radars and other weapon systems (for exam-
ple, a sub category of ELINT is Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (“FISINT”), which concern
electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of foreign aerospace,
surface, and subsurface systems). Focusing particularly on COMINT, the means of collection vary, and
may include tapping an underwater fiber optic cable, hacking into a Domain Name System (“DNS”)
Server, strategically placing antennas to collect free-roaming radio signals, or hiding a recorder in the
office of a particular high-profile target. For further reading, see id. at 118-27. Finally, Visual Intelligence
(“VISINT”) also referred to as Geo-Spatial Intelligence (“GEOINT”), Photographic Intelligence
(“PHOTOINT”), and Imagery Intelligence (“IMINT”) concerns the process of acquiring visual access to
places or objects that are otherwise inaccessible to intelligence agents. Today’s measures may include
sending a surveillance drone into the territory of a neighboring country, directing a reconnaissance satel-
lite to take images of the border region between two conflicting nations, and clandestinely placing a
camera in the office of a foreign military commander. For further reading, see id. at 107-118.
30. For more on whether OSINT gathering should be considered a form of espionage, see Arthur S.
Hulnick, The Dilemma of Open Sources Intelligence: Is OSINT Really Intelligence, in The Oxford Handbook
of National Security Intelligence 229 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2010).
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rights law constraints) and wartime espionage (where there is greater degree
of legal clarity as derived from the treatises of international humanitarian
law (“IHL”)).31
B. Old-School Absolutist Scholarship
The modern debates surrounding the permissibility of espionage in inter-
national law have their origins in the political philosophies of Kant and
Hobbes. In Perpetual Peace, Kant described the “employment of spies” as one
of those “diabolical arts” that are “intrinsically despicable.”32 Two years
later in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant expanded on his thinking, arguing
that a state may not engage “underhanded” means of defense that could
destroy the trust necessary for a lasting peace in the future, such as the
utilizing of citizen-spies, assassins, poisoners, or propagandists.33
This Kantian approach inspired later lawyers to mobilize against what
they perceived as a morally repugnant behavior. Fifty years prior to the ma-
terialization of the campaign to outlaw war with the Kellogg-Briand pact, a
failed campaign to outlaw espionage was attempted in the Netherlands. In
1880, as part of the drafting of a manual on the laws of war at the Institute
of International Law, a proposal was made and eventually rejected for a
treaty to be adopted that suppressed of all forms of espionage.34 Nonetheless,
at that time period moral resentment to espionage was a view shared by a
number of thinkers. E.I. Bekker from Heidelberg, for example, raised this
flag again in 1912, describing the practice of spying as a “repulsive phe-
nomenon” that could get in the way of “reasonable rapprochement among
nations.”35 Modern prohibitionists include Professor Manuel Garcia-Mora,36
Quincy Wright,37 and the Dutch Court in Re Flesche.38
31. This is not to say that some of the regulations I propose might not also be applicable, mutatis
mutandis, to both the domestic and wartime scenarios as well. In international law we are all too familiar
with spillage between foreign and domestic legal frameworks as well as wartime and peacetime legal
frameworks. The same is true for espionage.
32. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Kant: Political Writings 93, 97
(Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1st ed., 1970) (1797).
33. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 127 (Lara Denis ed., Mary Gregor trans., re-
vised ed. 2017) (1797).
34. Former Dutch Minister of War, Jacobus Catharjnus Cornelis den Beer Poortugael, was the one
who pushed for the rejection of the proposal. For further reading, see Édouard Clunet, Questions de
droit relatives a l’incident franco-allemand de Pagny (Affaire Schnæbelé) 27 (1887);
Victor Colonieu, L’espionage au point de vue du droit international et du droit pénal
Français 30 (Arthur Rousseau ed., 1888).
35. E. I. Bekker, Staatsverträge wider die Spionage (State Treaties Against Espionage), 17 Deutsche Juris-
ten-Zeitung [DJZ] 297, 297 (1912) (translated from the original German).
36. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition, and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of Extra-
dition, 26 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 65, 79-80 (1964) (“[P]eacetime espionage is regarded as an international
delinquency and a violation of international law.”).
37. See Wright, supra note 10. R
38. In re Flesche, Holland Special Court of Cassation (27 June 1949), reprinted in 16 Annual Digest
and Reports of Public International Law Cases: Year 1949, 266, 272 (Lauterpacht ed., 1955)
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On the other end of the spectrum, Hobbes believed that the supreme law
and duty of all sovereigns is to maintain the safety of their people.39 To
achieve that, states must collect intelligence, and Hobbes considered such
spying a “natural right.”40 He likened intelligence agents to both “rays of
light to the human soul” as well as to spiders’ webs, “whose incredibly fine
threads spread out in all directions and convey outside movements to the
spiders sitting in their little cavities inside.”41 Much like Sun Tzu,42 Nizam
Al-Mulk,43 and Hugo Grotius44 before him, Hobbes shared the thinking
that a leader who fails to spy is a lofty leader who abrogates a core responsi-
bility.45 Hobbes followed the Machiavellian notion that a ruler “must never
stop thinking about war and preparing for war and he must work at it even
more in peacetime than in war itself.”46 Modern permissivists have included
Lassa Oppenheim,47 Gary Sharp, Sr.,48 Christopher Baker,49 Julius Stone,50
and the German Federal Court in the Espionage Prosecution Case.51
(“[Peacetime espionage] when taking place by order of a State, constitutes an international delinquency
by that State against another State for which it is answerable under international law.”).
39. See Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen 143 (Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne ed. and
trans., 1998).
40. Id. at 145.
41. Id.
42. Sun Tzu, The Art of War 124 (Lionel Giles trans., 2015).
43. The 11th Century Persian scholar Abu Ali Hasan ibn Ali Tusi, or Nizam Al-Mulk, contended
that “[i]t is indispensable for a sovereign to obtain information on his subjects and his soldiers, on all
which happens near him or in distant regions, and to know about everything which is occurring, be it of
small or great importance. If he does not do so, this will prove a disgrace, a proof of his negligence and
neglect of justice.” Charles E. Lathrop, The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quota-
tions on Espionage & Intelligence 226 (2004).
44. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres 655 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925)
(1625).
45. See Hobbes, supra note 39, at 143-45; see also Arthur S. Hulnick & Daniel W. Mattausch, Ethics R
and Morality in U.S. Secret Intelligence, in Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Profes-
sional 40, 40-41 (Jan Goldman ed., 2006) (“[B]ecause a state has the responsibility to its citizens to
protect their lives, welfare, and property, it must take steps to understand the foreign threats, if there are
any, to those citizens as well as to the nation as a whole. . . . Historically, the notion that ‘Gentlemen do
not read each other’s mail’ has proven dangerous when applied to a state’s collection of information
affecting national security.”).
46. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 58 (Tim Parks trans., 2009).
47. 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise § 455, at 491 (1905) (noting that “all
States constantly or occasionally send spies abroad” and “it is neither morally nor politically and legally
considered wrong” to do so).
48. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Cyberspace and the Use of Force 123 (1999) (claiming that in
light of vast state practice international law has “specifically recognized a right to engage in [espionage]
as an inherent part of foreign relations”). Sharp was the first, to my knowledge, to recognize that a right
to spy under contemporary international law existed.
49. Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 Am. U. Int’l.
L. Rev. 1091, 1112-13 (2004) (arguing that espionage was necessary as it facilitated both cooperative
negotiations and cooperative compliance).
50. See Stone, supra note 10. R
51. Espionage Prosecution Case (Case No 2 BGs 38/91), Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of
Justice] Jan. 30, 1991, 94 International Law Reports [ILR] 68, 70, 1994 (Ger.) (“From the stand-
point of international law, espionage in peacetime could not be considered as unlawful. No international
agreement had ever been concluded on the subject. Neither was there any usage sufficient to establish a
customary rule permitting, prohibiting or otherwise regulating such activity.”).
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A third absolutist movement considers espionage as existing outside the
bounds of law, being “neither legal nor illegal.” Today, many international
legal scholars share the ominous contention that espionage, as a legal field, is
devoid of meaning. For them, any attempt to extrapolate the lex lata corpus
of the ILI, let alone its lex scripta, would inevitably flounder, as there is
nothing to extrapolate—espionage is simply an extralegal construct.52
In fact, the notion that international law is moot as to the question of if,
when, and how intelligence is to be collected, analyzed, or dispensed, has
been repeated so many times that it has become the prevailing view.53 This
fiction forms the basis for a Lotus world of action,54 one in which “states may
spy on each other – and on each other’s nationals – without restriction,”55
justifying their behavior through the argumentum ad hominem of “tu
quoque.” 56 Perhaps the most forceful proponent of this extralegal agenda in
recent years has been former Assistant General Counsel to the CIA, Professor
Afsheen Radsan.
As a participant in a 2007 symposium organized by the Michigan Journal
of International Law, Radsan produced an article where he compared the at-
52. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address: State Intelligence Gathering and International Law, 28
Mich. J. Int’l L. 543, 544 (2007) (“[M]ost lawyers would likely scoff at the notion that espionage
activities are constrained in any meaningful way by international law. Indeed, most probably believe that
international law’s only influence on espionage is that in wartime, spies caught behind the lines out of
uniform can be shot. Hardly a sophisticated or, to intelligence services, comforting notion.”); Baker,
supra note 49, at 1091 (“Espionage is curiously ill-defined under international law.”); Gary D. Brown & R
Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y
115, 116 (2014) (“[T]here is a long-standing (and cynically named) ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between
nations to ignore espionage in international law.”).
53. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 23, at 637-38 (“International law has never prohibited intelligence R
collection, in peacetime or wartime . . . . The history of state practice reveals that the regulation of
intelligence gathering has always been left to domestic enforcement . . . . Calls to pursue the establish-
ment of international entities or international law to regulate the intelligence collection activities of
nations-states are counterproductive.”); Deeks, supra note 9, at 293 (“[W]hy has international law had so R
little to say about how, when, and where governments may spy on other states and foreign citizens,
including by electronic means? . . . states sensibly concluded that the benefits to unregulated spying were
high and the corresponding costs were few.”).
54. Falk clarifies the role that the Lotus decision plays within the conventional account in explaining
the practice of peacetime espionage: “[A] voluntaristic theory of international obligations, as formulated
by the Lotus majority decision, gives a supporting analysis. The basic idea is that the objecting state has
the burden of showing that the defendant state acted in violation of an existing rule of international law.
Put affirmatively, this means that a state may do whatever it is not expressly forbidden to do by interna-
tional law. Thus, in areas where there is no consensus as to even the existence of a legal order, much less
its quality, a state may do whatever it pleases, subject only to another state’s right to act in self-defense.
Specifically, the United States may launch its observational satellites and the Russians may shoot them
down if they purport to do so in self-defense.” Falk, supra note 10, at 68. R
55. Deeks, supra note 9, at 301 (“Several government officials and scholars believe that the Lotus R
approach provides the best way to think about spying in international law. For them, the idea is simply
that nothing in international law forbids states from spying on each other . . . Spying is therefore
unregulated in international law.”).
56. Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment of Interna-
tional Legal Issues in Information Operations 40 (1999) (“The lack of strong international legal
sanctions for peacetime espionage may also constitute an implicit application of the international law
doctrine of ‘tu quoque’ (roughly, a nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which it itself
engages).”).
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tempts at regulating espionage with wizardry and alchemy. For Radsan, es-
pionage and international law could not be reconciled “in a complete
synthesis,” for the two start from different premises—one is rooted in the
peaceful resolution of conflicts, due regards to the rights of others, and good
faith and honest dealing; the other is centered around “treachery and de-
ceit.”57 He therefore concluded that “[i]nternational law does not change
the reality of espionage,”58 sending a clear message to future scholars inter-
ested in engaging in research and writing on the topic: “move to other
projects—with grace.”59
C. New-School Relativist Scholarship
Gracefully rejecting Radsan’s invitation, scholars in recent years have
moved towards the development of a fourth theoretical camp. This camp
may be described as the “sometimes legal, sometimes illegal” camp, or the
relativist piecemeal approach to the ILI. In this group we find writing that
“abandons the debate of whether ‘intelligence gathering’ or ‘espionage’ is
per se legal or illegal and instead subdivides the world of intelligence collec-
tion into constituent state acts . . . examin[ing] law governing specific con-
duct.”60 We could place the works of the likes of Craig Forcese,61 Iñaki
Navarrete,62 Russell Buchan,63 and Fabien Lafouasse,64 in this camp,65 as
well as Tallinn Manual 2.0.66
57. See Radsan, supra note 9, at 596. R
58. Id. at 623.
59. Id. at 597.
60. Forcese, supra note 9, at 68. R
61. Id.; see also Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J.
Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 179 (2011).
62. See Inñaki Navarrete, L’espionnage en temps de paix en droit international public, 53 Can. Y.B. Int’l L.
1 (2015); see also Inñaki  Navarrete & Russel Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage,
International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 Cornell Int’l L. J. 897 (2019).
63. See Russell Buchan, Cyber Espionage and International Law 192-93 (2019) (referring to
a “patchwork of norms” constraining acts of cyber espionage, which may be derived from examining
diplomatic and consular law, international human rights law, international trade law, and the law on
sovereignty); see also Navarrete & Buchan, supra note 62. R
64. See Fabien Lafouasse, L’espionage dans le droit international (2012). The final conclu-
sion of the book, in line with the piecemeal account, is that while an act of spying ipso facto is not
unlawful but only an unfriendly and tolerated act, specific types of spying operations conducted within
the territory of a state would violate its sovereignty and therefore constitute a violation of international
law that may trigger state responsibility. See id. at 461.
65. These scholars might have found their theoretical underpinnings in more historical works that
made similar claims. See, e.g., Gérard Cohen-Jonathan & Robert Kovar, L’espionnage en temps de paix, 6
Annuaire Français de droit int’l 239, 246 (1960) (noting that “undoubtedly espionage is unlawful
when it uses means that are prohibited by international law”); Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and
Immunity for Espionage, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 53, 67-69 (1984) (suggesting that “espionage appears to be
illegal under international law in time of peace if it involves the presence of agents sent clandestinely by a
foreign power into the territory of another state” and giving the example of diplomats committing acts
contrary to international law in the gathering of secret information); Noyes E. Leech, Covey T. Oli-
ver, & Joseph M. Sweeney, Cases and Materials on the International Legal System 264
(1973) (suggesting that espionage is illegal only if it involves trespass to the territory of other states).
66. See TM 2.0, supra note 12, and accompanying text. R
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Two features are common to piecemeal scholars. First, these scholars
equally discredit the “lex specialists” as they do the “extralegalists.” 67 For
them there is no special customary body of international law that can be said
to control the intelligence function.68 We should only look within the
broader lex generalis (namely the Charter principles of territorial sovereignty
and non-intervention, human rights law, and diplomatic and consular law)
to identify norms that control all of state behavior, then apply those most
relevant amongst them. As a result of their methodology, the framework
adopted by these scholars is one that puts significant emphasis on questions
of territoriality.69 An undercover spy in a fedora hat and trench coat taking
pictures of a foreign parliament house,70 or a diplomat conducting intelli-
gence operations against her host country from within her embassy,71 will
always violate international law, as they violate both general treaty provi-
sions (for example those enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (“VCDR”)) and general customary principles (for example the
principle of territorial sovereignty). These scholars thus limit acts of lawful
67. See, e.g., Forcese, supra note 9, at 81 (“The take-home point is this: to the extent that commenta- R
tors are inclined to treat intelligence activities as a unique area immunized from international law or
subject to some special, more relaxed lex specialis, they exaggerate considerably.”); see also Navarrete &
Buchan, supra note 62, at 952 (suggesting that extralegalist arguments are “no longer taken seriously,” R
arguing further that the defenders of espionage have begun claiming the existence of customary excep-
tions, an argument which Navarrete and Buchan believe should be equally debunked).
68. See, e.g., TM 2.0, supra note 12, at 169-70 (“[T]he IGE agreed that customary international law R
does not prohibit espionage per se.”). Note that the Experts relied on a single source, the Office of General
Counsel, Department of Defense Law of War Manual, to make this claim. However, paragraph 16.3.2, to
which they cite, makes no reference to a lack of customary regulation of espionage under international
law. Quite the opposite: it speaks clearly of “long-standing and well-established considerations” and
“long-standing international norms” which govern this practice. Department of Defense, Law of War
Manual 990 (2016). The IGE further concluded that while there are no customary rules in international
law prohibiting spying per se, espionage may nonetheless be conducted “in a manner that violates interna-
tional law due to the fact that certain of the methods employed to conduct cyber espionage are unlaw-
ful.” TM 2.0, supra note 12, at 169–70. The experts claimed that the principle of territorial sovereignty, R
the prohibition on coercive intervention, and the human right to privacy could all be cited as bases for a
violation of international law by particular methods of spying. Id.; see also Navarrete & Buchan, supra note
62, at 902 (referring to “a ‘checkboard’ of principles of international law . . . that indirectly regulate R
peacetime espionage on the basis of the underlying conduct of States.”) Note further that a minority of
the members of the IGE were willing to entertain the idea that there exists a lex specialis of espionage law,
but their position was ultimately rejected. Id. at 19.
69. For example, see the concluding tables provided in Forcese, supra note 61, at 209 and Navarrete, R
supra note 62, at 63-64, as well as the figure in Lafouasse, supra note 64, at 311. They all establish R
distinctions of law based on the activity’s territorial or extraterritorial nature.
70. See, e.g., TM 2.0, supra note 12, at 19 (the majority took the view that, “if organs of one State are R
present in another State’s territory and conduct cyber espionage against it without its consent or other
legal justification, the latter’s sovereignty has been violated.” The majority acknowledged that there is
widespread state practice of such acts of spying, but nonetheless argued that, “States have not defended
such actions on the basis of international law.”).
71. Id. at 211-12, 229 (the IGE argues that if a sending state launches spyware from within its
diplomatic mission against the cyber infrastructures of another state that would constitute “an abuse of
the diplomatic function and therefore an internationally wrongful act”). The same is true for the oppo-
site, spying on a diplomatic mission. Forcese has claimed that spying on diplomats, even if widespread,
cannot be squared with the actual rules found in the VCDR and therefore “while spying on diplomats
may be commonplace, it is no less a violation of the Convention.” See Forcese, supra note 61, at 197. R
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espionage only to those activities that take place remotely72 (for example
remote sensing from a satellite, aerial or naval vehicles, or remote intercep-
tion of communications that just happen to cross through the surveilling
state’s electromagnetic spectrum or internet infrastructure),73 or with the
knowledge and authorization of the target state or the Security Council.
This framing of the ILI is unsatisfactory for four reasons. Most significant
is the fact that this approach ignores widespread state practice of interstate
territorial and diplomatic spying as well as the crucial functions that such
intelligence operations play in our contemporary legal order. Relying heav-
ily on the myth system, by merely citing generic treaty provisions and lex
generalis principles, these scholars seem to give no weight to the operational
code. They try to defend this point by citing to the silence of states. If
secrecy surrounds peacetime espionage, that is to say if countries are unlikely
to provide public statements in support of their operations, there is no opinio
juris and therefore there can be no basis to make claims for customary rights
or exceptions that could justify such spying.74 Navarrete and Buchan adopt
an ever more poetic tone. As they write:
The essence of the problem is this. Customary espionage excep-
tions have yet to clear a path through the legal wilderness. If the
path-takers zigzag so that there are no clear tracks; if they are
careful to cover their footprints; and if they consistently deny fol-
lowing new tracks when they are caught in the act, then there can
be no identifiable paths and no understanding that they should be
followed.75
This argument is problematic as it treats secrecy as if existing in a binary.
Either something is secret and therefore it should have no impact on the
evolution of custom or it isn’t. In reality, however, every act of state secrecy
is located on a continuum between two poles: shallow secrets and deep
secrets.76 Shallow secrets, those secrets the general existence of which is
known (even where detailed specifics about them remain hidden), do in fact
72. Note that Forcese and Navarrete distinguish further between two types of “remoteness” — acts
that are purely extraterritorial (where both the governmental agents and their targets are located on the
territory of another state) and acts that are transnational (where the target of the surveillance, for example
the documents or the communications, are located/taking place on the territory of another state, but the
governmental agents are at home).
73. Consider in this regard the European Court of Human Rights decision in Weber & Saravia v.
Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 309 ¶ 88.
74. See Buchan, supra note 63, at 161 (“[S]ilence is the antithesis of opinio juris and under these R
conditions state practice cannot mature into binding rules of customary law . . . .”). Baked into Buchan’s
argument is the additional notion that practice must be of a public character to contribute towards the
development of customary international law. This is because only public displays of state practice can be
the subject of an “iterative process of claim and response” between sovereign states from which custom
can emerge. See Navarrete & Buchan, supra note 62, at 920. R
75. Navarrete & Buchan, supra note 62, at 952-53. R
76. For further reading, including a summary of the literature around shallow and deep secrets, see
David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (2010).
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play a role in our understanding of the evolution of custom.77 In that regard,
peacetime espionage is becoming more and more a shallow secret. The silent
war is no longer so silent.78 These open secrets can and do shape law-making
processes and their substantive outcomes in more nuanced ways, such as in
the relationship between the secret-knowers, the intelligence agencies and
governments. As noted by the former legal advisor to the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office of the U.K. Government, Sir Daniel Bethlehem, “one
cannot make assumptions about what the law is, or reach considered conclu-
sions on whether conduct is lawful or unlawful, until one has considered the
invisible conduct, as well as the visible.”79
Ultimately, because they ignore state practice and deny the prospect of
opinio juris, these scholars fail to truly capture the reality and thereby lose
their target audience: members of intelligence communities who are un-
likely to accept such stringent normative framing. For this exact reason,
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman took a completely different position in
1973, suggesting that “[t]he gathering of intelligence within the territorial
confines of another state is not, in and of itself, contrary to international law
unless it contravenes policies of the world constitutive process affording sup-
port to protected features of internal public order.”80 Obsessing over territo-
riality, in the way that piecemeal scholars tend to do, misses a real
opportunity for us to begin articulating what those “policies” and “pro-
tected features” might be in our contemporary world.
Take for example the issue of diplomatic and consular law. As Ches-
terman notes, “[d]iplomacy and intelligence gathering have always gone
hand in hand.”81 Citing to the emergence of modern diplomacy in Renais-
sance Italy, Chesterman highlights that “a chief function of the resident
ambassador soon became to ensure that a continuous stream of foreign polit-
77. Daniel Bethlehem, The Secret Life of International Law, 1 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 23, 36
(2012); see also Alexandra H. Perina, Black Holes and Open Secrets: The Impact of Covert Action on International
Law, 53 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L. 507, 568 (2015) (suggesting that the non-acknowledgement by the
acting state of a certain act would preclude it “from relying on that conduct as evidence that defines or
shapes the law,” but doesn’t preclude everyone else from relying on it). This makes sense. Instead of
suggesting that everyone is barred from relying on open secrets in the development of new customary
international rules, we limit this sanction only to the ones who continue to deny the action ever took
place. This could incentivize those “neither-confirm-nor-deny” states to favor policies that support
greater transparency, statutory interpretation, and public regulation as a gateway into getting a seat
around the rule-making table.
78. Jack Goldsmith, A Partial Defense of the Front-Page Rule, Hoover Institution (Jan. 29, 2014),
https://perma.cc/5MKX-AWNM (“[S]ecret intelligence actions . . . are increasingly difficult to keep
secret.”).
79. Bethlehem, supra note 77, at 36. R
80. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 17, at 395. R
81. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1087; see also W. Michael Reisman, Accord on Embassy Espionage Would R
Ease U.S.-Soviet Tensions, New Haven Reg., Sept. 11, 1988, at B3 (“Diplomacy and espionage are
related and sometimes even symbiotic. Getting [intelligence on a foreign enemy] requires placing people
you can trust in your enemy’s capital. That’s why diplomacy was invented . . . Embassies that can’t
collect information and relay it back in secrecy to their governments are ineffective.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 17 18-FEB-20 12:03
2020 / The Liberty to Spy 201
ical news flow[ed] to his home government.”82 This is why ambassadors
were described as early as the 17th century as “honorable spies.”83 These
acts of diplomatic spying continue even more forcefully in the age of elec-
tronic communications. During the enactment of the U.S. Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act in 1978, for example, Congress discussed the issue of
electronic surveillance of diplomatic premises and its compatibility with the
rules of the VCDR at length. As Forcese highlights: “[t]he Administration
overcame this concern by supplying a list of states that surveilled U.S diplo-
matic premises abroad, suggesting that such a widely accepted practice,
while not authorized by the Convention, did not violate it.”84 There is sig-
nificant evidence to back the administration’s argument, as the practice of
spying from and on diplomatic missions is indeed as historical as it is
commonplace.85
Consider the following three alleged reports from the past two decades:
(1) In the lead up to the U.N. Security Council vote authorizing to use force
against Iraq in 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom spied on
delegations to the Security Council;86 (2) During the G20 talks in Toronto
in 2010, the United States and Canada spied on large numbers of heads of
states and other diplomats in attendance,87 and in 2013 it was Russia’s turn
to provide its guests with bugged gift bags in the form of malware-filled
USB sticks as part of the G20 summit in Saint Petersburg;88 (3) Between
2012 and 2017, Chinese agencies used backdoors into computer networks at
the African Union Headquarters (networks which China paid for and in-
stalled as a gift) in order to spy on the various delegations.89
If one wanted to apply the new school piecemeal model to these opera-
tions, one would have to conclude that all of them violated international
law, because “while spying on diplomats may be commonplace, it is no less
a violation of the Convention.”90 Adopting this position seems skewed. It
stays true to a zealous defense of textual provisions while failing to give
weight to the robust practice of states, which not only conduct such surveil-
lance operations, but indeed tolerate them as a component of international
82. Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1087. R
83. Ithiel de Sola Pool, International Intelligence and Domestic Politics, in Surveillance and Espionage
in a Free Society 272, 274 (Richard H. Blum ed., 1972).
84. See Forcese, supra note 61, at 197. R
85. See Deeks, supra note 9, at 313 (citing Antonin Scalia, who at the Department of Justice OLC R
drafted a memorandum that concluded that “the practice of spying on foreign missions was so wide-
spread that the ‘inviolability’ provision of the VCDR should not be read to prohibit such activities”).
86. See, e.g., Martin Bright & Peter Beaumont, Britain Spied on UN Allies over War Vote, The Guard-
ian (Feb. 7, 2004), https://perma.cc/TY8U-UCD2.
87. See, e.g., Paul Owen, Canada ‘Allowed NSA to Spy on G8 and G20 Summits’, The Guardian (Nov.
28, 2013), https://perma.cc/EX65-2S2A.
88. See, e.g., Stuart Heritage, Putin’s USB Spy Sticks and Other Dodgy Espionage Tricks, The Guardian
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/MH7C-LD6G.
89. See, e.g., Reuters, China Rejects Claim it Bugged Headquarters it Built for African Union, The Guard-
ian (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/XPN3-QZ9J.
90. See Forcese, supra note 61, at 197. R
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political life.91 Piecemeal scholars seem to abet their own deception, “avoid-
ing the truth like someone pulling blankets over his head to avoid the cold
reality of dawn.”92 However, as Kelsen had taught us “the validity of the
law presupposes a minimum efficacy of the law.”93 If the myth system be-
comes so disassociated with the operational code, it losses all sense of
gravitas; piecemeal scholars seem to show no degree of concern to this fact,
far from it—they shine light on this disconnect, thereby intensifying it.
To be clear, I am very sympathetic to piecemeal scholars’ attempts to
push the envelope of the ILI by sketching normative lines. I further support
the general idea that the legality of espionage operations is relative—some-
times legal and sometimes illegal depending on a case-by-case analysis of the
circumstances. Nonetheless, the basis for such determinations of law cannot
rest solely on the technical question of the territory from which the opera-
tion is taking place, or the existence of certain international protections,
immunities, or privileges around the specific target of the surveillance in
question. These factors are but some of many criterions that need to be
examined before a conclusion on legality can be reached.94
A second reason to reject the existing relativist account is its ineffective-
ness in regulating the entire phenomenon of espionage. Piecemeal scholars
address only the law governing specific methods of spying in isolation from
91. See W. Michael Reisman & Eric E. Freedman, The Plaintiff’s Dilemma: Illegally Obtained Evidence
and Admissibility in International Adjudication, 76 Am. J. Int’l L. 737, 751-52 (1982).
92. See W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. 229,
237 (1977). Dinstein, who wrote about certain law of armed conflict scholarship which has gone so left of
field that it has disconnected itself from battleground realities, such “legal chatter of armchair
quarterbacks is no different from static in a telecommunications system. It must be separated from the
genuine sound of law.” Yoram Dinstein, Keynote Address: The Recent Evolution of the International Law of
Armed Conflict: Confusions, Constraints, and Challenges, 51 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 701, 709 (2018).
Speaking more broadly, Glennon has written that “[t]reaty rules as well as customary rules fall into
desuetude when they change from working rules to paper rules. Clarity of analysis is not advanced by
confusing the two; paper rules may still in some circumstances generate compliance, but not often
enough to qualify as law, for the key element of obligation is missing.” Michael J. Glennon, The Fog
of Law: Pragmatism, Security, and International Law 228 (2010).
93. See Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures, 1940-1941 16 (1942).
94. In the analysis of the Jus In Exploratione, that is the law that governs the choice of means and
choice of targets during an espionage operation, one consideration would have to be whether the opera-
tion is proportionate, which would be derived in part by its level of intrusiveness. This echoes moral
philosophy theories that center around a metaphorical “escalation ladder.” See, e.g., Ross W. Bellaby,
The Ethics of Intelligence: A New Framework 170 (2014); R. V. Jones, Reflections on In-
telligence 50 (1989); Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 Am. J. Int’l
L. 284, 305 (1992); see also Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International
Law, 102 Va. L. Rev. 599, 671-75 (2016) (suggesting that we adopt a pragmatist sliding scale taking
into consideration different variables to determine the degree of flexibility intelligence agencies should
be given in interpreting relevant international law. Those variables are: (1) the risk of error and quantum
of harm; (2) the identity and nature of the target; (3) the nature of the international rules potentially
violated; and (4) the existence of more overt and less intrusive means for achieving a similar aim). I
completely endorse these factors, but I would go even further to suggest that Deeks’s flexible analysis
might have actual legal (and not mere policy) underpinnings if one considers certain general principles of
international law (such as rule of law, good faith, proportionality, effectiveness, fairness, and comity) as
rule clarifiers.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 19 18-FEB-20 12:03
2020 / The Liberty to Spy 203
intelligence programs as a whole. In other words, they offer regulation of the
Jus In Exploratione (the law governing the choice of means and targets in the
conduct of spying) while leaving a lacuna as far as the Jus Ad Explorationem is
concerned (what limits exist on the decision to launch espionage operations
in the first place). In so doing they exacerbate a known problem in the
literature on intelligence ethics: the vast majority of the literature seems to
only be interested in “the ethical dilemmas raised during the collection of
intelligence”95 while ignoring the ethical dilemmas raised during all other
stages of “the intelligence cycle.”96 By rejecting the idea that there exists a
lex specialis of espionage law, piecemeal scholars have barred themselves from
having any say over which are and are not legitimate reasons for spying. If
legality is only rooted in an analysis of the means selected by the agencies,
not in their programmatic motivations, then there is no room for interna-
tional law to regulate much of the decision-making around which operations
should be deemed necessary, and in fact on what necessity ultimately means
for spycraft. Analogizing to the use of force, contemporary piecemeal think-
ers seem eager to explain whether the use of chemical weapons or white
phosphorus violates international law before they address the analytically
distinct and far larger question of if and when is it lawful to go to war in the
first place. Before we engage in a tactical review of the legality of particular
means of spying (say bribery, torture, non-official covers, mass surveillance,
CCTV cameras, or automated facial recognition), we should ask ourselves if
and when is it lawful to spy. This is the focus of this paper.
A third concern with relativist piecemeal scholarship relates to the role it
plays in entrenching regional and global social structures and enforcing a
specific constellation of power and knowledge dynamics. This concern
brings to bear Third World Approaches to International Law (“TWAIL”)
literature. Authorizing remote spying while prohibiting territorial spying
serves the goals of those states who are sufficiently powerful and technologi-
cally advanced to have the capacity to engage in such expensive forms of
espionage. Chimni had written that “where international law does not pene-
trate national spaces, powerful states put into effect laws that have an extra-
territorial effect; third world states have little control over processes
initiated without [their] consent in distant spaces.”97 Western foreign sur-
veillance laws that authorize these programs of bulk remote interception of
communications offer an example. Third world countries are impacted twice
95. Hans Born & Aidan Wills, Beyond the Oxymoron: Exploring Ethics Through the Intelligence Cycle, in 2
Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional 34, 45 (Jan Goldman ed., 2010).
96. What has come to be known as the “intelligence process/cycle” refers to a cyclical chain of routine
steps taken “from policy makers perceiving a need for information to the community’s delivery of an
analytical intelligence product to them.” See Lowenthal, supra note 22, at 70. Most articulations of this R
cycle follow the same general structure: (a) planning and direction; (b) collection; (c) processing; (d)
analysis; (e) dissemination and consumption; then back to (a) and the wheel goes round and round.
97. See B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, in The Third World
and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization 47, 57 (Antony Anghie et al. eds.,
2003).
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by the piecemeal conceptualization of espionage law: once because they be-
come the subject of these mass remote surveillance programs over which
they have no control, and again because their own more primitive and less
costly forms of territorial and diplomatic spying have now been deemed
unlawful.
What is more, a legal regime that is based on legitimizing remote forms
of espionage while prohibiting territorial spying further incentivizes states
to rely on corporate actors as “surveillance intermediaries”—remote collec-
tors and analyzers of raw digital communications and communications
data.98 We have witnessed this development in recent years, states turning
to social media corporations and internet service providers to do the hard
work of storing our ever-growing volumes of online human experiences fur-
ther profiling our behaviors, from our iPhones tracking our geolocation and
email metadata, to our Amazon Ring Doorbells security cameras surveilling
our streets, to our FitBits marking changes in our physical activities.99 This
trend triggers “a global law without the state,” a “lex mercatoria” where
“the transnational corporate actor is the principal moving force in decentral-
ized law-making.”100 Piecemeal scholars have overlooked potential TWAIL-
critiques of their articulation of the ILI, a dynamic that has helped “create a
global system of governance suited to the needs of transnational capital but
to the disadvantage of third world peoples.”101
Finally, as information becomes more “un-territorial,”102 and as espionage
goes more and more digital,103 relying on territorial line drawing as the sole
basis for the regulation of intelligence operations becomes less defensible. It
should, therefore, not be surprising to find piecemeal scholars struggling to
stipulate what rules should govern cyber-espionage. For how should we treat
a scenario where agents from Country A, while sitting in their headquarters,
gain complete access to and steal documents from governmental computers
located in Country B, while spoofing servers located in Countries C, D, and
98. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 99, 112 (2018) (“In today’s
world, government surveillance—whether targeted or programmatic, for law enforcement or foreign in-
telligence—relies on the cooperation of a small number of technology companies that are large, multina-
tional, and opposed to it.”).
99. See, e.g., Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human
Future at the New Frontier of Power 387 (2019) (describing how both intelligence agencies and
law enforcement have turned to what Zuboff coins “instrumentarian power” to conduct their investiga-
tions. She specifically provides the examples of Fitbits, Amazon Echo, and smart pacemakers, as well as
broader collaborations with Google and Facebook in the fight against international terrorism).
100. See Chimni, supra note 97, at 58. R
101. Id. at 60; see also Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of
Postcolonialism 22 (2005).
102. Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 Yale L. J. 326, 365–78 (2015).
103. See Forcese, supra note 9, at 77-78 (“Until recently, there was an obvious territorial element to R
covert actions—and indeed, almost all intelligence activity—that eased the assessment of legality . . . .
The communications revolution, however, has changed the physical locus of at least some state action and
has therefore created awkward questions for geocentric international law.”); see also TM 2.0, supra note
12, at 170-71 (“The Experts were incapable of achieving consensus as to whether remote cyber espionage R
reaching a particular threshold of severity violates international law.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 21 18-FEB-20 12:03
2020 / The Liberty to Spy 205
E?104 The Canadian courts seem to have adopted the position that such oper-
ations would result in extraterritorial enforcement actions in violation of
international law.105 But to suggest that these operations are either akin to
or distinguishable from physical human spying is a matter of choosing one’s
preferred analogy, and whatever analogy is eventually endorsed seems to me
to likely be difficult to justify, hard to explain, and complicated to apply.106
Ultimately, we should agree that such cyber/kinetic comparisons are suscep-
tible to manipulation in the name of advancing particular policy agendas, as
is the case for all analogizing in the field of law and technology.107
The problem of using territorial lines as the legal standard for addressing
new forms of remote surveillance has also manifested itself in the debates
surrounding maritime and aerial reconnaissance operations conducted from
inside and above a coastal state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”). Much
like cyberspace, the EEZ’s legal regime’s interaction with the principle of
sovereignty is a tenuous one. Galdorisi and Kaufman described the EEZ as a
“zone of tension between coastal state control and maritime state use of the
sea,” for it is where territorial waters clash against waves from the high
seas.108 This tension, coupled with the advancement of new maritime sur-
veillance technologies for reconnaissance, has triggered multiple well-publi-
104. See, e.g., Aaron Shull, Cyber Espionage and International Law, GigaNet: Global Internet Govern-
ance Academic Network, Annual Symposium 1 (2013) (noting that cyber intrusions do not seem to
offend the principle of territorial integrity in the same way as the sending an actual state agent to gather
human intelligence.) Ultimately, Shull concludes that “[t]he international governance regime surround-
ing cyber espionage is still in its infancy” and that “the norms that govern conduct in cyber space are in
a period of flux and evolution.” Id. at 15. As such “it is not entirely clear how the legal rules or norms of
conduct will develop within this policy space.” Id. at 19; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the
International Law of Cyberspace, 42 Yale J. Int’l L. Online 1 (2017) (discussing the legal grey zones
associated with below-the-threshold remote cyber operations, including cyber-espionage, and the diffi-
culty in applying traditional international law principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention to
them).
105. In the Matter of an Application by [redacted] for Warrants Pursuant to Sections 16 and 21 of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23, 2018 F.C. 738, ¶¶119–47 (Can.).
106. Buchan had made the claim that “states exercise territorial sovereignty over the cyber infrastruc-
ture that is physically located within their territory.” He further argued that “an act of cyber espionage
. . . . that penetrates computer networks and systems supported by cyber infrastructure situated within
the territory of another state constitutes a violation of that state’s territorial sovereignty, irrespective of
whether that operation causes damages or harm.” See Buchan, supra note 63, at 54. Buchan further R
argues that his contention is rooted in state practice. Id. This argument stands in stark contradiction with
the recent collapse of the negotiations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Secur-
ity after they failed to reach agreement as to the way the U.N. Charter principles, including the principle
of sovereignty, should apply to cyberspace, see, e.g., Elaine Korzak, UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of
an Era?, The Diplomat (July 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/8SEF-VKS7, as well as the recent statement of
the U.K. Attorney General who refused to apply the principles of sovereignty to cyberspace, see, e.g.,
Jeremy Wright QC MP, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century, Attorney General’s Office
(May 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/PAS6-RK44.
107. Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 209, 214 (2016) (“[T]he law and
technology literature—particularly around information privacy—is plainly aware of the role metaphor
can play in channeling legal outcomes in the context of emerging technology.”).
108. George V. Galdorisi & Alan Kaufman, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing
Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 253, 257 (2002).
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cized confrontations around EEZ surveillance.109 Adopting a piecemeal
geographical zoning of espionage law fails to offer us a framework for miti-
gating these tensions, as we are unable to conclude determinatively whether
spying within or above the zone—like in cyberspace—is akin to territorial
surveillance and therefore illegal or to surveillance from the global commons
and therefore legal. The development of high-altitude durable surveillance
balloons and drones poses a similar challenge as we find it difficult to iden-
tify the legal lines between spying from the territorial airspace and outer
space.
Piecemeal normative accounts fail to persuade as they ignore the open
secret that all states engage in peacetime territorial and diplomatic spying;
they avoid an analysis of the functions of espionage and thereby the justifica-
tions for launching espionage operations; they neglect to address TWAIL-
critiques further incentivizing a market for private surveillance by affluent
states; and they rest on territorial line drawing in a surveillance age that is
proving more and more unterritorial. A new normative account is thus
sorely needed.
D. Introducing the Lex Specialis of the ILI
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), in its groundbreak-
ing Zakharov v. Russia decision, laid the foundation for the regulation of
clandestine intelligence gathering. The court clarified that secret surveil-
lance measures may be reviewed “[A]t three stages: when the surveillance is
first ordered, while it is being carried out, or after it has been termi-
nated.”110 A normative diagnosis of intelligence done at three distinct tem-
poral phases (before, during, and after) should not seem unfamiliar to
students of international law. After all, our traditional paradigms for con-
trolling violence, enshrined in the post-Charter prohibition on the use of
force, already recognize the distinction between Jus Ad Bellum (“JAB”), Jus
In Bello (“JIB”), and Jus Post Bellum (“JPB”).
If peacetime espionage serves the dual role of being both the great politi-
cal stabilizer (increasing the potential for peaceful settlement of disputes and
cooperation by reducing the chances for strategic surprises)111 and the great
political destabilizer (working in the service of the “continuation of war by
the clandestine interference of one power into the affairs of another
109. See Asaf Lubin, The Dragon-Kings Restraint: Proposing a Compromise for the EEZ Surveillance Conun-
drum, 57 Washburn L. J. 17 (2018).
110. Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 2015-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 58–59.
111. See James E. Baker, Prelude to Decision: Michael Reisman, the Intelligence Function, and a Scholar’s
Study of Intelligence in Law, Process, and Values, in Looking to the Future: Essays on International
Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman 73, 76 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011); Michael
Herman, Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001, in 2 Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelli-
gence Professional 106 (Jan Goldman ed., 2010) (“[G]overnments drawing on a professional stan-
dard of intelligence knowledge tended to behave as more responsible members of international society
than those that had to manage without it, or chose to do so . . . .”).
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power,”112 triggering an intelligence-driven security dilemma spiral113) it
makes sense to tie its regulation to the same international structures that
bind states’ use of their other stability-impacting apparatuses: their military,
diplomatic, and ideological instruments.
Philosophical literature surrounding the ethics of intelligence work has
proposed that Just War Theory (“JWT”) might serve as a useful tool in the
regulation of espionage. In 1986 at a Conference on Military Ethics and
Education in Washington D.C., Chomeau and Rudolph introduced one of
the earliest detailed articulations of the application of JWT to the practice of
espionage, arguing that “implied in ‘just war’ theory [is] a basis for the
right of one government to interfere in the affairs of another, so long as the
principles of just cause, just means, proportionality, etc., prevail.”114 Simi-
larly, in 1989 William E. Colby argued that standards for the selection of
just covert activities “can be developed by analogy with the long-standing
effort to differentiate just from unjust wars.”115 As is explicit in the name,
Just War Theory is a doctrine of ethics establishing criteria for the utiliza-
tion of organized armed force, not espionage. Nonetheless, there are compel-
ling reasons to compare and analogize clandestine intelligence collection and
the use of force as the two are “sources of national power and instruments of
foreign policy” that are routinely used by states to “defend their own na-
tional interests and manage world peace and stability” and which “give[ ]
rise to ethical concerns” for their violation of core communal principles, like
the principles of non-intervention, territorial integrity, and sovereign equal-
ity.116 What is more, intelligence operations are not only similar in nature to
uses of force; they are also extensions of them, derivative prerequisites neces-
sary to operationalize those very uses.117
For these reasons, there is an analytical justification to subject both the
right of states to use force and the right of states to spy to the same founda-
112. James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War 21 (1992).
113. See Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 371 (1996) (Herman ex-
plains that intelligence gathering “may produce its own spiral of increased threat perceptions among its
targets, leading to more secrecy and more intrusive collection.”).
114. John B. Chomeau & Anne C. Rudolph, Ethical “Need to Knows” for Intelligence Officers, 2 (1986),
https://perma.cc/F86F-QTND.
115. William E. Colby, Public Policy, Secret Action, 3 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 61, 63  (1989); see also
James A. Barry, Managing Covert Political Action: Guideposts from Just War Theory, 36 Stud. Intelligence
19 (1992).
116. Angela Gendron, Just War, Just Intelligence: An Ethical Framework for Foreign Espionage, 18 Int’l J.
Intelligence & Counterintelligence 398, 408-10 (2005).
117. Bitton, supra note 25, at 1017 (“The argument has two distinct forms. In its first form, it asserts R
that intelligence is analogous to the use of force and is therefore justified under the same conditions. The
other form casts intelligence as an inherent element of the use of force, as its natural extension. Whether
directly or by analogy, the Just Intelligence approach argues that JWT should regulate espionage and
serve as its source of legitimacy.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 24 18-FEB-20 12:03
208 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 61
tional framework, or in other words, to have JWT “regulate espionage and
serve as its source of legitimacy.”118
Two primary challenges have been raised in the literature against relying
on JWT as the justification for espionage. The first is concerned with the
normative value of open-ended standards in international law. Mark Phytian
has noted his skepticism as to the value of rooting ILI in JWT, suggesting
that the tests it adopts “involve subjective judgments taken in specific na-
tional contexts.”119 This is the classic realist argument against JWT and
arguably against any international legal or moral constraint on national po-
litical power. As Paskins summarizes:
Realists often think that the just war tradition is so vague and
ambiguous, so indeterminate in practice, that its fine words lend
themselves to so many conflicting interpretations as to afford no
definite guide to policy. If we are in a mood to debate ‘moral
realities,’ so the skeptical argument goes, then realists will choose
interpretations that suit them, interpretations shaped by realism,
not by the just war tradition. Whether to employ the just war
idiom may be a matter partly of taste, partly of political context,
but the deep realist thought is that this language is too vague to
be doing any real work.120
Although this version of realism—which reasons that morality has no
place in international politics—undoubtedly has its adherents,121 it fails on
descriptive grounds. Walzer has correctly shown that “for as long as men
and women have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of
right and wrong.”122 Reaching moral judgments on war, as on intelli-
gence—no matter how difficult or problematic such a process might prove
to be—is not, and has never been, futile. Even if the rules are likely to be
distorted or misinterpreted, even if their application will be shrouded with
hypocrisy, even if for “men at war, the rules often don’t seem relevant to the
extremity of their situation,”123 engaging in law and ethics talk is as preva-
lent as it once was, and one can assume this is because this exercise holds
118. Id.; see also Chomeau & Rudolph, supra note 114, at 9 (“Since the major function of intelligence R
is to provide early and adequate warning of an attack by forces inimical to the nation, one can derive an
extension of the ‘just war’ principles to intelligence.”).
119. David Omand & Mark Phythian, Ethics and Intelligence: A Debate, 26 Int’l J. Intelligence &
Counterintelligence 38, 57 (2013).
120. Barrie Paskins, Realism and the Just War, 6 J. Mil. Ethics 117, 119 (2007).
121. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace 13 (6th ed. 1985) (“To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to
pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another
. . . . [I]t is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral
excess and that political folly.”).
122. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illus-
trations 3 (4th ed. 2006).
123. Id. at 15.
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some value. Moralists must never surrender their ultimate sense that war
and intelligence, are “a human action, purposive and premeditated, for
whose effects someone is responsible.”124
A second more specific criticism raised against the utilization of JWT in
the study of intelligence ethics concerns the differences between war and
espionage. The primary claim here is that “war is an exceptional case and
intelligence is an enduring state. The Just War conditions govern the transi-
tion from peace to war. But the intelligence machine is always active in
some form.”125 Bitton argues that JWT serves as a tool for deterrence and
punishment because aggressors can be identified. “JWT facilitates identify-
ing the aggressor by imposing a baseline norm of non-violence.”126 Against
this backdrop of peace and quiet, argues Bitton, illegitimate attacks are
identified immediately “like the first drop of ink falling on a sheet of white
paper.”127 Aggression in espionage, however, is unobservable, “like reading
white letters on that same sheet of white paper.” That is because peacetime
intelligence, claims Bitton, “is an ongoing operation.”128
The counterargument, however, is twofold. First, we should reject the
notion that the act of launching an aggressive war is always “identifiable,”
as Bitton suggests. In the 21st century we have witnessed a move towards
the “forever war,” the perpetual fight against global terrorism, in which
states constantly expand their goals and objectives in conflicts, introducing
more complex threats to be addressed and new targets to be neutralized.129
Surely Bitton does not mean to suggest that JWT has fallen silent in the
wake of these new types of conflicts, simply because of their continuous,
ever-evolving nature.130
Similarly, to argue that espionage is a unitary continuous motion, and
therefore “unobservable,” is divorced from practice. The fact that intelli-
gence agencies give codenames to espionage operations (e.g. Operation Ivy
124. Id.
125. Omand & Phythian, supra note 119, at 52. R
126. Bitton, supra note 25, at 1018-19. R
127. Id. at 1018.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Mark Danner, Spiral: Trapped in the Forever War 10 (2016) (“the permanent
politics of fear makes the country uniquely vulnerable to the very terrorism it means to combat. A vast
counterterror apparatus has arisen that serves to magnify the importance of each terrorist attempt, and
politicians and the press do their part to multiply the fear. . . . We have fallen into a self-defeating spiral
of reaction and counterterror. Our policies, meant to extirpate our enemies, have strengthened and per-
petuated them.”).
130. For an example of JWT analysis of the global war on terrorism, see, e.g., Neta C. Crawford, Just
War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War, 1 Persp. on Pol. 5, 20-21 (2003) (suggesting that despite the
recent “transformation of war” and the challenges that the fight against terrorism has introduced, “just
war theory is remarkably resilient, which may be in part due to the codification of some of its core
normative precepts into international law, and in part to its hard-headed recognition that violent conflict
is a recurrent feature of international life.”); But cf. Naomi Sussmann, Can Just War Theory Delegitimate
Terrorism?, 12 Eur. J. Pol. Theory 425, 439 (2013) (suggesting that just war theory was formulated “in
a different world, for a different world. Its categories and distinctions now break down or are no longer
relevant.”).
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Bells, Project ColdFeet, Operation Lunik, Operation Socialist, Operation
Optic Nerve) alone would suggest that they are distinguishable from one
another. Indeed, we speak of the “intelligence cycle” for a reason. It has a
beginning, a middle, and, yes, an end. It is derived directly from the differ-
ent stages and organization of the intelligence process, from policymaker’s
demands to agencies’ specific directives and guidelines to collectors’, ana-
lysts’, and translators’ supply. Each operation requires a mission statement,
and each agent and agency turns back to that statement to locate the inter-
nal and external rationales behind each of their actions. These statements,
directives, guidelines—and ultimately reasoning—could all be the subject
of a review which addresses both the justifications for the operation (the jus
ad) and the operative methods employed in the conduct of the operation (the
jus in).
In other words, the identification of unjust wars and unjust intelligence is
neither to be compared to “a drop of ink falling on a sheet of white paper”
nor to “reading white letters on that same white sheet;” it is rather closer to
finding Martin Handford’s famous Waldo in a sea of other colorful charac-
ters. Only the most determined of assessors might actually end up spotting
what they were after. Identifying acts of aggressive wars and abusive spying
thus requires patience and stamina, not any different than finding Waldo’s
red and white striped outfit.
My proposed framework thus adopts the structures of JWT. We can
reconceive of the regulation of peacetime interstate espionage, the ILI, as a
framework of three paradigms: the Jus Ad Explorationem (JAE) (the law gov-
erning the right to launch espionage operations), the Jus In Exploratione (JIE)
(the law governing the choice of means and targets in conducting espionage
operations), and the Jus Post Explorationem (JPE) (the law triggered after the
espionage operations have ceased, concerning both ILI’s prescription
processes and accountability regimes).
Nonetheless, it is important to clarify that “to the student and practi-
tioner of international law in the twenty-first century, the just war ethic is
clearly part of moral theology” that only carries a “lingering flavor” over
our legal paradigms.131 JWT must not be confused for the law itself. The
post-Charter order relied on the moral, ethical, and theoretical insights of
JWT but then adapted and fitted them to meet the institutional structures
put forward by the Charter’s drafters. The modern-day prohibition on the
use of force is more a reflection of treaty norms, customary practices, and
general principles than of some theological dogma. As the ICJ noted in the
South West Africa case, a court of law “can take account of moral principles
only insofar as these are given sufficient expression in legal form.”132 To my
131. Joseph C. Sweeney, The Just War Ethic in International Law, 27 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1865, 1865
(2004).
132. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.) (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, para. 49 (July
18).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 27 18-FEB-20 12:03
2020 / The Liberty to Spy 211
knowledge, there has yet to come an international lawyer who has attempted
to pick up the gauntlet by giving such “expression in legal form” to the
philosophical accounts of “just intelligence.” This paper seeks to offer such a
translation so that “just intelligence” too could have actual bearing on the
evolution of international law and an impact on the practice of espionage.
To engage in this act of “legal translation,” I put particular emphasis
throughout my framing on general principles of international law. It is im-
portant to clarify that I do not consider these principles as “gap fillers,”
transforming the adjudicative process into a legislative one by offering sup-
plemental rules where treaty law and customary law are non linquet.133
Rather I see them as ‘standard clarifiers,’ serving the purpose of defining
“the depth and contours of broad or amorphous legal provisions” where
international conventions and customs offer little organizational help.134 In-
deed one of the most fundamental functions of general principles is to pro-
mote the “organic growth” of international law,135 especially when it is
lagging behind new pressing problems or technological developments.136
Within the limits of this paper I focus only on my articulation of the JAE,
discussing the existence of the right to spy as derived from a large set of
international legal sources (Part III), the scope of the right to spy as an
Hohfeldian liberty right (Part IV), and the limits of the right to spy result-
ing from the application of the doctrine of “abuse of rights” (Part V).
II. The Sources of the JUS AD Explorationem
A. The Right of States to Survival and Collective Self-Determination
There are different points of view as to the existence and nature of the
right of states to survival. On the one end of the spectrum stand thinkers
like Secretary of State Dean Acheson who argued during the 1963 ASIL
Annual Meeting that “law simply does not deal with such questions of ulti-
mate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty. . . . No
law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival of states is not a
matter of law.”137 In other words, Acheson believes the survival of state
133. For a criticism of this aggressive usage of general principles as adjudicative “gap fillers,” see
Johan G. Lammers, General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, in Essays on the Develop-
ment of the International Legal Order: In Memory of Haro F. van Panhuys 53, 64–69 (Frits
Kalshoven, Pieter Jan Kuyper & Johan G. Lammers eds., 1980).
134. Charles T. Kotuby Jr. & Luke A. Sobota, General Principles of law and Interna-
tional Due Process: Principles and Norms Applicable in Transnational Disputes 31–32
(2017).
135. See Maarten Bos, The Recognized Manifestation of International Law, 20 German Y.B. Int’l L. 9,
42 (1977) (noting that general principles “should be able to provide international law with a most
welcome possibility for growth”).
136. See, e.g., C. Wilfred Jenks, The Proper Law of International Organizations 259–60
(1962); M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law,” 11 Mich.
J. Int’l L. 768, 777–78 (1990).
137. Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc., 13, 14 (1963).
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cannot and should not be subjected to mortal rules and regulations, it is
rather a sort of fundamental, absolute, and overriding right.138
Some, such as Austrian international law professor and diplomat Alfred
Verdross, consider the right of states to survive to be a softer liberty right
that does not impose obligations on third parties, as opposed to a fundamen-
tal right:
Any State, it is true, is legally free to ensure its preservation, as
doing so does not violate the rules of the Law of Nations. This
freedom, however, does not correspond to a duty placed on other
States. They are under no obligation to tolerate anything that is
necessary for the preservation of other States.139
Finally, on the far end of the spectrum are those that argue that the right
of states for survival, to the extent that it still exists as a matter custom, has
been overtaken by the Charter right of self-defense and its parallel doctrine
of necessity. Lauterpacht noted as early as 1955 that it is becoming “more
and more recognized” that “violations of other States in the interest of self-
preservation are excused in cases of necessity only.”140 He then proceeded to
give an example of a state that becomes “informed” that a group of armed
men are organizing in a neighboring territory. To the extent that “the dan-
ger can be removed through an appeal to the authorities of the neighboring
country,” no right of self-preservation will stand. But if “such an appeal is
fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay, a case of necessity
arises,” and a right to take self-defensive measures in the name of preserva-
tion is authorized.141
Scholars who adopt Lauterpacht’s approach cite as proof of their position
the fact that few modern international instruments still recognize an abso-
lute right for self-preservation. For example, the ILC in drafting the Decla-
138. There have been quite a number of scholars who have recognized the right of self-preservation as
being incorporated into the broader doctrine of “fundamental rights of States.” Kohen does a terrific job
of listing these scholars, beginning with Hobbes and proceeding to 19th and 20th century natural law
thinkers. See Marcelo G. Kohen, The Notion of ‘State Survival’ in International Law, in International
Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons 293, 299–303 (Laurence Bois-
son de Chazournes & Phillipe Sands eds., 1999); see also Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A
Treatise 207 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). Nonetheless, the idea that the right of self-
preservation is a “fundamental right” is highly contested. Those who oppose it argue that if we consider
self-preservation “an absolute and overriding right” it would result in international law becoming “op-
tional, and its observance would depend on a self-denying ordinance, revocable at will by each State, not
to invoke this formidable superright.” See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of Interna-
tional Law, 87 Recueil des cours de l’Academie de droit International 191, 195 (1955); see also
James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations 404 (6th ed. 1963) (“Such a doctrine would destroy the
imperative character of any system of law in which it applied, for it makes all obligation to obey the law
merely conditional.”).
139. Alfred Verdross, Règles générales du droit international de la paix, 30 Recueil des cours de
l’Academie de droit International 271, 415 (1929) (translated from the original French). I address
the notion of liberty rights later in this paper.
140. Oppenheim, supra note 138, at 298. R
141. Id.
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ration on the Rights and Duties of States specifically excluded preliminary
language proposed by Panama that introduced as Article 1 the idea that
“every State has the right to exist and to preserve its existence.”142
This brings us to the wording of the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, where the Court observed that it “cannot lose sight of the funda-
mental right of every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-
defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter when its survival is at
stake.”143 The ICJ left matters sufficiently ambiguous. Whereas “fundamen-
talists” will find solace in the top half of the Court’s reasoning, Charter
defenders will find their comfort in the bottom half of that same sentence.
To this already robust body of scholarly interpretations I simply want to
add another possible way of conceiving of the right of self-preservation—
that is as an extension of the right of collective self-determination. Modern
international law recognizes the right of a people to decide their own destiny
in the international order by freely determining their political status.144
Dinstein provides the example of the right to fend off existential threats to
the polity as an extension of collective self-determination rights. He notes
that “if the local people is truly at liberty to determine its political status, a
post-debellatio annexation by the victorious State must clearly be pre-
cluded.”145 Surely, however, Dinstein’s logic can be expanded beyond a sim-
ple limit on post-occupation annexation. Indeed, a broader right can be
asserted, in the name of collective self-determination, for peoples to fight
against any attempts at the obliteration of their political manifestation.
Philip Marshall Brown alluded to this when he argued that of the rights
endowed with states, “the solid rock of international law,” is the right of
states to exist, which he defined as a “mutual guarantee between nations,
great and small, of their legal right to a separate existence in order to realize
their own aspirations and destinies.”146
Examining this entire body of literature, one key observation emerges.
Regardless of where one identifies in terms of the spectrum of positions as to
the existence, nature, and scope of the right to survival, all of them necessi-
tate that states enjoy a corollary and derivative right to engage in peacetime
intelligence gathering. You may be an Acheson and seek to exude your un-
constrained power over the threat of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba, or a
Lauterpacht who is only attempting to remain “informed” as to the imme-
142. See Kohen, supra note 138, at 295–96. For a complete review of the relevant international instru- R
ments which predominantly exclude language relevant to self-preservation, see id. at 295–98.
143. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263
(July 8).
144. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (establishing the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples); Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90,
102 (June 30) (concluding that the assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination has an erga
omnes character “is irreproachable”).
145. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 182 (5th ed. 2011).
146. Philip Marshall Brown, The Rights of States under International Law, 26 Yale L. J. 85, 87 (1916).
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diate threat posed by an armed group in a neighboring territory, or a Din-
stein who in the name of collective self-determination hopes to protect the
polity against a pending and unlawful occupation and annexation, or the ICJ
authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons in the extreme circum-
stance where “the very survival of a State would be at stake.” Regardless of
who you are and what position you take, you must recognize that founda-
tional to your conceptualization of the “right to survive” is the associated
right to develop at-all-times as complete and as accurate a picture of the
impending threats to your nation and its people. For it is this derivative
right to spy that operationalizes the right to survive.
B. The Inherent Right of Individual or Collective Self Defense
Dating back to the Caroline incident of 1837, the right of states to en-
gage in pre-emptive self-defense in order to avert an attack that is “instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and moment of deliberation”147
has been extensively documented and analyzed.148 Even textualists who still
maintain, based on the wording of the Charter, that a right of self-defense
applies only “if an armed attack occurs,” cannot ignore the diverse and ro-
bust subsequent practice by states.149 The 2004 High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change established by the U.N. Secretary-General
thus recognized that “a threatened State, according to long established in-
ternational law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is
imminent, no other means would deflect it, and the action is
proportionate.”150
Regardless of what interpretation of “imminence” one adopts, from a
classically restrictive “Pearl Harbor”-type position to a highly permissive
“Bush doctrine”-styled approach,151 the right of self-defense will embrace a
state’s derivative right to engage in peacetime intelligence gathering. If a
state is entitled to retaliate against imminent threats, by definition it must
be allowed to engage in peacetime espionage to gather the information nec-
147. See British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School
(2008), https://perma.cc/ST6Z-ASBQ.
148. For a summary of the literature, see Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence, Max Planck Ency-
clopedia Pub. Int’l L. (Apr. 2011). For a more recent review of the literature, see Monica Hakimi,
North Korea and the Law on Anticipatory Self-Defense, EJIL: Talk! (Mar. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/J695-
SXED.
149. W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-
Defense, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 525, 526 (2006) (noting that anticipatory self-defense was not, in their view,
“in the contemplation of drafters of the Charter, though claimed by many to have been grafted thereon
by subsequent practice,” followed by a showing of such practice through case studies).
150. U.N. Secretary-General, High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), https://perma.cc/9HP3-
DSRC.
151. For more moderate interpretations, see Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or
Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 769 (2012); Jeremy Wright, The Modern Law
of Self-Defence, EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/ML53-JPZG.
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essary to assess whether any threats are imminent (regardless of whatever
level of imminence is deemed sufficient to justify military action).152
This derivative right also holds even were we to adopt the formalistic and,
in my view, anachronistic approach that only Article 51 governs the use of
force (and therefore that a state may only react to an imminent threat by
seeking Security Council authorization to use force). Because the United
Nations does not have its own intelligence capacities, the Security Council
must rely on member states’ intelligence in order to fulfill its mandate of
maintaining peace and security. A delegation must engage in peacetime es-
pionage to be able to prove to the Security Council that a threat is mount-
ing, so as to convince its members to vote in favor of a Chapter VII
resolution.
The case study of Israel’s espionage operations against Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram offers a good example of the interrelations between the right of self-
defense and the derivative right to spy. Recall the image of the Prime Minis-
ter of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, in his speech at the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in September 2012, drawing a red line at 90% enrichment
over a cartoon of an Iranian uranium nuclear bomb.153 At the time different
positions were suggested as to whether Israel had the legal right to strike
Iran. Alan Dershowitz claimed that given that Iran directed the 1992 attack
on Israel’s embassy in Argentina, and was supplying weapons to its proxies
in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, who had used those weapons to attack
Israel in the past, an armed attack had already occurred. The “law of war
does not require an immediate military response to an armed attack,” he
claimed, adding that, “[t]he nation attacked can postpone its counterattack
without waiving its right.”154
On the other side, Kevin Jon Heller claimed that it is unlikely that Ira-
nian links to Hezbollah and Hamas are sufficiently close to satisfy the legal
standard of “overall and effective control.” Therefore, he claimed, it would
be impossible to make their actions imputable to Iran and thereby justify an
action in self-defense. He added further that, “even if they did, just because
there may be an armed attack on Israel by Hamas doesn’t mean you can take
out a country’s nuclear programme. There has to be some kind of necessity
and proportionality between the armed attack and the response.”155
152. See Baker, supra note 49, at 1095–96 (“[I]n order to ensure that the right to self-defense retains R
substantive meaning, international law must permit states to predict armed attack. Therefore, for states
to enjoy the positively-codified right to self-defense, they should retain the right to acquire information
that would indicate whether they face imminent armed attack.”).
153. See, e.g., Harriet Sherwood, Netanyahu’s Bomb Diagram Succeeds –But Not in the Way the PM
Wanted, The Guardian (Sept. 27, 2012), https://perma.cc/PV9L-YXKL.
154. Alan Dershowitz, Israel Has the Right to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Reactors Now, Huffington Post
(Mar. 16, 2011, 6:07 PM), https://perma.cc/REA9-XABS.
155. Chris McGreal, Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Legal Debate Stirs over Basis for US or Israeli Attack, The
Guardian (Apr. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/EW4W-L7C4.
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Former legal advisor to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professor
Robbie Sabel, agreed with Heller, citing to existing ICJ jurisprudence and
concluding that “supplying arms and training to an enemy of a State does
not, by itself, constitute an armed attack against that State.”156 Nonetheless,
focusing on anticipatory self-defence, Sabel noted that it would be necessary
for Israel to prove that Iran’s development of nuclear weapons was “a dire
threat” and that “there was no other way to prevent such development.”157
Notice how fundamental a reliable and discernible stream of intelligence
is in the context of the prohibition on the use of force. To prove Dersho-
witz’s point that Iran was behind the 1992 embassy attack, or Keller’s point
that Iran’s support of Hezbollah in Lebanon does not rise to the level of
either overall or effective control, or to meet Sabel’s test of a “dire threat”
leaving no alternative or moment for delay—one needs evidence. One also
needs evidence to prepare for the attack and make sure it meets the necessity
and proportionality requirements set under JAB. What’s more, to build an
effective international campaign behind such strikes, verifiable evidence that
is capable of being shared across agencies is vital prior to the launch of the
attack.
Fast forward to 2018. Netanyahu ran yet another performance of red-meat
rhetoric and pop comedy, this time in the form of a staged unmasking of
55,000 printed pages and 183 compact discs stolen from Iran’s secret nu-
clear archives.158 While the Iranians scoffed at Netanyahu’s theatrics, calling
it a “prearranged show”,159 not even they challenged the legality of Israel’s
Mossad agents operating deep in Iran as part of the operation. More interest-
ingly, the P5+1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency welcomed
the opportunity to review the trove of documents provided by the Israeli
intelligence.160 These actors were not worried about being found complicit
in a violation of international law simply by accepting the stolen documents;
quite the opposite, they accepted them knowing very well that they were
156. Robbie Sabel, The Legality of an Attack Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, INSS Insight (June 15,
2012), https://perma.cc/2S4D-P7P5.
157. Id.
158. David M. Halbfinger, David E. Sanger & Ronen Bergman, Israel Says Secret Files Detail Iran’s
Nuclear Subterfuge, N.Y. Times (Apr. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/ND7C-UWCF.
159. Id. (citing Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi. Araghchi went on to suggest that
Netanyahu’s remarks were “a very childish and even a ridiculous play” coordinated with the Trump
administration to destroy the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran around its
nuclear program); see also Oren Liebermann, What did Netanyahu Reveal About Iran’s Nuclear Program?
Nothing New, Experts Say, CNN (May 3, 2018, 5:21 AM), https://perma.cc/2BWN-N238 (citing to other
skeptics who challenged whether the stolen materials revealed any actual new intelligence that was not
previously known).
160. See Ron Ben-Yishai, European Delegations to Review Iranian Nuclear Archive, Ynet News (May 1,
2018, 3:45 PM), https://perma.cc/359R-9HAJ.
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produced as part of a territorial spying operation to advance non-prolifera-
tion goals.161
Our international legal order places the burden of proof,162 and therefore
the burden of intelligence collection, analysis, and verification, on the party
alleging the fact (e.g. the threat), so States seeking to use their force in accor-
dance with the Charter and customary law are encouraged to establish effec-
tive peacetime foreign intelligence apparatuses. In the context of the above
case study and in line with this legal scheme, Israel was almost invited, if
not required, to spy on Iran. Iran, in turn, is equally motivated to spy back
on Israel.163 The broader international community benefits from such recip-
rocal spying which increases the transparency around the strategic plans of
both the rivalling nations. While we can debate the minutiae of the legal
regime of Articles 2(4) and 51—who has the right to use force, against
whom, and under what circumstances—there can be no debate that the
right of sovereigns to spy, in the name of protecting their national security,
is what activates those Charter provisions. Without it those Articles will
become a dead letter.
C. Collective Monitoring Obligations Under UN and Treaty Law
While large international organizations, like the United Nations, have
various means for directly collecting information (e.g. field studies, inter-
views, forensic analysis, open source analysis of images and videos, soliciting
assistance from civil society, etc.),164 certain determinations—perhaps the
ones of most significance, such as those made in the context of establishing
state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts or individual criminal
liability for international crimes—could only be ascertained by consulting
raw national security intelligence. In this regard it is important to recall the
161. See Joby Warrick, Papers Stolen in a Daring Israeli Raid on Tehran Archive Reveal the Extent of Iran’s
Past Weapons Research, Wash. Post (July 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/688E-FTDA (noting that the half a
ton of documents was shared with U.S. and European intelligence agencies as well as with the IAEA).
162. With respect to matters of fact, the ICJ has adopted the principle of onus probandi incumbit actiori
(“the burden of proof is on the claimant”). As the court has held on multiple occasions, the party
alleging the fact bears the burden of proving it. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 172 (Feb.
3); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J.
Rep. 392, ¶  101 (Nov. 26). As for the standard of proof the ICJ has recognized that “claims against a
State involving charges of exceptional gravity [e.g. use of force] must be proved by evidence that is fully
conclusive.” Croat. v. Serb., 2015 I.C.J. Rep at ¶  178 (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment,
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 17 (Apr. 9)). In Corfu the court noted that if evidence is in the “exclusive territorial
control” of the respondent, the claimant “should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact
and circumstantial evidence.” U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. Rep. at 18.
163. See, e.g., Dov Lieber, Former Israeli Minister Admits to Spying for Iran, Wall St. J. (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8REW-BASS (reporting on a case of Iranian spying on Israel).
164. For a complete analysis of the sources of information available at the United Nations, see Ekpe,
supra note 20 and accompanying text. R
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words of former Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali who clarified in
1993 that the United Nations simply had no intelligence to call its own.165
The World Health Organization’s capacity to investigate large-scale
epidemics is dependent on cooperation and assistance from national health
services,166 and as we have already witnessed, the same is true for the needs
of the IAEA in monitoring compliance with the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.167 International institutions, in the fulfillment of their varied man-
dates, continue to rely significantly on intelligence produced by their mem-
ber states. From disarmament obligations168 to counter-terrorism efforts,169
and from running effective sanctions regimes170 to providing assistance in
disaster relief and humanitarian crises,171 there isn’t an area of work within
the broader umbrella of “collective security” that doesn’t require such
information.
The international community, aware of this political reality, has estab-
lished various treaty regimes that demand the collection and dissemination
of information. A few early examples originated during the Cold War. Con-
sider SALT I,172 and the Anti-Balistic Missiles (ABM) Systems Treaty,173
both signed in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those
treaties laid down a framework for reciprocal spying (“national technical
means of verification” if to embrace the euphemism) between two super
powers. “In a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of in-
165. Simon Chesterman, Shared Secrets: Intelligence and Collective Security, in 10 Lowy Institute Papers 7
(2006) (citing Georgie Anne Geyer, Limited Tools for Complex Tasks, Dallas Morning News (Sept. 28,
1993)).
166. See generally, World Health Org., WHO Report on Global Surveillance of Epidemic-prone Infec-
tious Diseases, U.N. Doc. WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/2000.1 (2000).
167. See OTA Report, supra note 20 and accompanying text; supra notes 158–160 and accompanying R
text.
168. See, e.g., Allison Carnegie & Austin Carson, The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and Inter-
national Organizations, 63 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 269, 269 (2019) ( “[T]o punish states effectively, the interna-
tional community must first learn about [breaches of disarmament obligations], yet this is difficult since
states hide their violations and international organizations often lack the authority and resources to
intrusively monitor compliance. While many states possess extensive intelligence capabilities that allow
them to detect violations of treaties and norms, they often refuse to fill these informational gaps.”).
169. See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
(CTED), Terrorism Financing, (2018) https://perma.cc/M8VD-TSKK (suggesting that in order to
tackle terrorism financing effectively it is essential to rely on member states exchanging of operational
information and intelligence).
170. See, e.g., Counter-terrorist sanctions regimes Legal framework and challenges at
UN and EU levels, Briefing, European Parliament, 2 (Oct., 2016), https://perma.cc/JX4Q-BCT8
(suggesting that listings and designations for sanctions are dependent on classified intelligence and confi-
dential information provided by member states).
171. See, e.g., Mirielle M. Petitjean, Intelligence Support to Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance, 19
Intelligencer: J. U.S. Intelligence Stud. 57 (2013) (canvassing examples for uses of IMINT,
SIGINT, and OSINT in disaster relief operations).
172. Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., art. V, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 [“SALT I”].
173. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XII, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435
[“ABM Treaty”].
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ternational law,” each power was allowed to use such technical means of
verification and the other power was prohibited from interfering with those
measures.174
The Treaty on Open Skies,175 with its 34 ratifiers, offers a contemporary
example despite some recent enforcement issues.176 This treaty does exactly
what SALT I and the ABM Treaty did, just on a global scale; it establishes
an affirmative right to spy in the territorial airspace of members while set-
ting strong limitations on their ability to interfere with that right. I will
revisit this point again when introducing the distinction between claim
rights and liberty rights in the following Section.
One can think of other treaties, such as certain counter-proliferation and
counter-terrorism treaties which establish intelligence collection and sharing
obligations,177 or treaties for environmental protection and for the preserva-
tion of Antarctica, which similarly introduce certain monitoring and obser-
vations rights and obligations on member states.178 A particularly powerful
example might come in the form of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Con-
vention, which expressly depends on parties to bring complaints before the
Security Council showing any breach by another party of the obligations
enshrined therein. Each complaint must include “all possible evidence con-
firming its validity.”179
But the buck does not just stop at treaty frameworks. The Security Coun-
cil too has acknowledged the role that member states play in its ability to
fulfill its mandate. Most recently it adopted Resolution 2396, a Chapter VII
resolution concerning threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts.180 In that Resolution the Council not only called on member
states to “intensify and accelerate” their peacetime intelligence collection
174. Id.
175. Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. 102.37. The Treaty on Open Skies
establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its signatories. The
Treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless
of size, a direct role in gathering information through aerial imaging on military forces and activities of
concern to them.
176. See, e.g., Steve Liewer, Rollback of Open Skies Treaty Comes as Relationship Between Russia, U.S. Gets
Chillier, Omaha World Herald (Jan. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/R7RU-SPVU.
177. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 2178
U.N.T.S. 228 (Dec. 9, 1999) (establishing certain obligations for the cooperation between states in the
prevention of terrorist financing, including through the collection and exchange of information); Model
Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the Application of Safeguards, U.N. Doc. INFCIRC/540 (Sept. 1, 1997) (requiring states to provide
the IAEA with information about a variety of nuclear-related activities that supplements the information
already provided by the states pursuant to their comprehensive safeguards agreements).
178. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 U.N.T.S. 69, art. 17 (June 5, 1992) (requir-
ing member States to facilitate the exchange of information relevant to the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity); The Antarctic Treaty, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, arts. III(1) and VII(6) (June 23,
1961) (setting obligations for the sharing of information between members).
179. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriologi-
cal (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, art. VI (Apr. 10,
1972).
180. S.C. Res. 2396, ¶ 5 (Dec. 21, 2017).
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efforts, but went on to suggest exactly what measures they should em-
ploy.181 The Council decided that member states “shall develop and imple-
ment systems to collect biometric data, which could include fingerprints,
photographs, facial recognition, and other relevant identifying biometric
data.”182 Other measures ordered by the Council were the collection of pas-
senger information,183 the development and implementation of watch lists
and databases on suspected terrorists,184 and increased cooperation with
technology companies in gathering a myriad of digital records.185
A final example comes in the form of the guidelines that control the
workings of the 1267 Committee (the ISIL (Da’esh) and al Qaida Sanctions
Committee of the Security Council). Paragraph 6(h) of the most recent
guidelines cover the obligations of listing states. The Committee relies on
statements from these states which should cover a demonstration that the
individual or entity meet the criteria for listing, including details of any
connections with currently listed individuals or entities, information about
relevant activities, and information about relevant court cases and proceed-
ings brought against the subject. The guidelines directly mention “intelli-
gence” as one of the sources to be relied on in compiling the application
(alongside information from law enforcement, judicial proceedings, and
open source data).186
It is this increased level of engagement with intelligence sources necessary
for the functioning of collective security mechanisms in the 21st century,
that brought Professor Chesterman to advocate for reforms within interna-
tional agencies in the area of their assessment and verification capabilities.187
After all, the intelligence shared with U.N. agencies may not always be
accurate or truthful. Indeed, “interested policy-makers quickly learn that
intelligence can be used the way a drunk uses a lamp post – for support
rather than illumination.”188 Increasing international organizations’ capacity
to properly examine the intelligence they receive, if not providing them
their own limited intelligence gathering capabilities, thus seems desirable.
D. International Human Rights Law
The international community has taken significant steps to enhance pri-
vacy protections since the signing of the ICCPR in 1966 and the Human
181. Id.
182. Id., at ¶ 15.
183. Id., at ¶¶ 11–12.
184. Id., at ¶ 13.
185. Id., at ¶ 21.
186. S.C. Comm. Pursuant to Res. 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2353 (2015) concerning ISIL
(Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups undertakings, and entities, Guidelines of the
Committee for the Conduct of its Work, ¶ 6(h) (last amended Dec. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/RAV7-
B5V4.
187. See Chesterman, supra note 165, at viii–ix. R
188. Thomas Lowe Hughes, The fate of facts in a world of men: Foreign policy and
intelligence-making, 22 (The Foreign Policy Ass’n ed., 1976).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\61-1\HLI104.txt unknown Seq: 37 18-FEB-20 12:03
2020 / The Liberty to Spy 221
Rights Committee’s adoption of General Comment No. 16 on the right to
privacy in 1988. These accomplishments include, since 1999, a significant
body of work on human rights and surveillance practices by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on
Freedom of Expression and Counter-Terrorism.189 The repeated adoption of
both U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and U.N. Human Rights Council
Resolutions, by consensus, on the right to privacy in the digital age also
marks a significant step forward.190 The 2015 creation of the position of
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy is itself a reaffirmation of
the international privacy agenda, and his reports to the Council further sig-
nify the importance of his new role as an international intelligence watch-
dog.191 The Human Rights Committee has too begun to routinely address
surveillance legislation and practices in its Concluding Observations to
States, beginning in 2014.192 On the regional level, the ECtHR, the Court
of Justice of the European Union, and the Inter-American Commission and
189. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009); Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/17 (June 4, 2012); Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013); Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human
Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014); Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Prot. of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May
22, 2015); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 (May 11, 2016); Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/61 (Feb. 21, 2017).
190. G.A. Res. 69/166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/166 (Dec. 18, 2014); Human Rights Council Res. 28/
L.27, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/L.27 (Mar. 24, 2015); G.A. Res. 71/199, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/71/199 (Dec.
19, 2016); Human Rights Council Res. 34/L.7/Rev.1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/L.7/Rev.1 (Mar. 22, 2017).
See also Human Rights Council Res. 33/L.6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/L.6  (Sept. 26, 2016).
191. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/64 (Mar.
8, 2016); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, U.N. Doc. A/71368 (Aug. 30, 2016).
Kinfe Michael Yilma, The United Nation’s Evolving Privacy Discourse and Corporate Human Rights Obliga-
tions, 23(4) ASIL Insights (May 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/CM8Q-BKD5 (describing the installation
of a new mandate for the special rapporteur as reflecting an emerging and novel discourse around privacy
at the United Nations); for a critique of the work of the Special Rapporteur to date, see Marc Rotenberg,
Urgent Mandate, Unhurried Response: An Evaluation of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, 3
Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 47 (2017).
192. For further reading see Yuval Shany, On-Line Surveillance in the Case-law of the UN Human Rights
Committee, Hebrew Univ. Cyber Sec. Research Ctr. (July 2017), https://perma.cc/BW4H-K55R
(noting that “whereas questions relating to [surveillance] were raised with respect to two states between
2007-2014, since 2014 they have been addressed with respect to 15 different states (representing more
than 25% of the states reviewed by the Committee during this period). This sharp rise is suggestive both
of the growing resort to on-line surveillance powers by governments due to advances in available technol-
ogy, and of growing awareness to their human rights implications by the Committee.”).
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Court on Human Rights have all developed authoritative jurisprudence on
surveillance and privacy.193
At the same time, however, it would be wrong to assume that interna-
tional human rights law is focused only on the constraints. The High Com-
missioner for Human Rights had acknowledged that the need to collect
intelligence is a “legitimate aim” for governments to pursue.194 Article 8 of
the European Convention of Human Rights further establishes that the in-
terests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the
country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of public health
or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, can all be
considered grounds for interferences with the right to privacy.195 In the lead-
ing judgment on this issue from 1978, Klass and Others v. Germany, the
ECtHR acknowledged the need of states to “undertake . . . secret surveil-
lance” and its necessity “in a democratic society.”196 Similarly, in Leander v.
Sweden the ECtHR observed that national authorities enjoy “a margin of
appreciation” in collecting and storing in “registers not accessible to the
public information on persons” for the purpose of protecting national
security.197
While both of Klass and Leander concerned domestic targeted surveillance
operations, the ECtHR has also applied this rationale in foreign mass sur-
veillance cases. Most recently in Centrum För Rättvisa v. Sweden the ECtHR
noted that “bulk interception regimes did not per se fall outside” intelli-
gence agencies’ margin of appreciation.198 They argued further that in view
of advancements of communications technology, the rise of global terrorism
and serious crime, and the “unpredictability of the routes via which elec-
tronic communications are transmitted,” the decision to operate a bulk in-
terception regime was justified.199
International Human Rights law further recognizes the right of states to
take certain extreme measures, which derogate from the rights enshrined in
193. For a complete study including proper citation to all of these recent developments, see Privacy
International, Guide to International Law and Surveillance (Feb. 2019), https://perma.cc/
VU84-4DEY.
194. Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the
Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37, ¶ 24 (June 30, 2014).
195. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8 (Nov. 4, 1950).
196. Klass & Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 48 (Sept. 6, 1978).
197. Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 58–59 (Mar. 26, 1987).
198. Centrum Fo?r Rättvisa v. Sweden, ECtHR, App. No. 35252/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 112 (June 19,
2018). See also Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, App. No. 58170/13, Judg-
ment, ¶ 317 (Sep. 13, 2018) (“[R]equiring objective evidence of reasonable suspicion in relation to the
persons for whom data is being sought and the subsequent notification of the surveillance subject would
be inconsistent with the Court’s acknowledgment that the operation of a bulk interception regime in
principle falls within a State’s margin of appreciation. Bulk interception is by definition untargeted, and
to require “reasonable suspicion” would render the operation of such a scheme impossible. Similarly, the
requirement of “subsequent notification” assumes the existence of clearly defined surveillance targets,
which is simply not the case in a bulk interception regime.”).
199. Id.
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the corpus, in times of emergency threatening the life of the nation (ICCPR,
Art. 4, ECHR, Art. 15).200 In those exceptional situations201 international
law anticipates that states will take preventative and restorative steps to
protect their polity (note that both the right to privacy and the right to
freedom of expression, are in fact derogable rights). There is nothing in the
Conventions that expressly prohibits these derogations from taking place in
an extraterritorial fashion (e.g. in a foreign surveillance context). In conclu-
sion, international human rights law recognizes the right of states to spy
when necessary and only in a proportionate manner. In fact, in recognizing
that the collection of intelligence is necessary for the protection of rights,
such as the right to life, and for preserving national security and public
order, human rights law might be said to introduce a due-diligence duty on
the state to spy.
E. International Humanitarian Law
Article 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii) of the first Additional Protocol (API) to the Geneva
Conventions is reflective of customary international law in both interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts.202 The Article establishes that
those who plan attacks “must do everything feasible to verify” that the objec-
tives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects, nor subject to
special protection, and “must take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack” with a view to avoiding and minimizing
incidental and collateral damage.203 Pictet’s Commentary to Article 57 clari-
fies further that by “feasibility” the drafters indeed thought about intelli-
gence analysis and verification as one primary measure to be taken.204 This
was further expanded on in the report of the ICTY’s Expert Committee to
investigate the 1999 NATO Bombing. The Committee noted that “a mili-
tary commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect
and evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must
also direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets
during operations.”205
200. See also American Convention on Human Rights, 144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 27 (Nov. 21, 1969)
(providing for the suspension of guarantees “[i]n times of war, public danger, or other emergency that
threatens the independence or security of a State Party”).
201. Lawless v. Ireland, ECtHR, App. No. 332/57, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 28 (July 1, 1961).
202. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S 3, arts. 57(2)(a)(i)–(ii) (1977) [hereinafter API];
ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 15 (vol. I, 2005).
203. Id.
204. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Proto-
cols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 681 (Yves Sandoz, Chris-
tophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
205. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 50 (June 13, 2000), https://perma.cc/LGZ9-
DQGD [hereinafter “ICTY’s Expert Report”].
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Needless to say, the only relevant time to begin establishing such an “ef-
fective intelligence gathering system” is in preparation for war and not after
the armed conflict had already begun. Indeed, under IHL militaries are ex-
pected to be able to engage in lawful targeting that is both discriminate and
proportionate from the first frame of the belligerent theater of conflict
onwards.
Consider, the specific issue of aerial operations. The targets of such at-
tacks range from a warehouse to a rocket launcher, from the vehicle or home
of a particular insurgent, to a secret meeting of top military leaders or ter-
rorists in a distant hideout. It might also include potential dual-use targets,
such as power grids, broadcasting stations, oil refineries, airports, marine
ports, highways, and bridges. Intelligence information collected for the pur-
poses of targeting these types of objects will usually cover six unique fea-
tures: (1) The GPS coordinates of the target and its geophysical location; (2)
Continuous aerial footage of the target and its surroundings, establishing
“patterns of behavior”; (3) Classification of the various functions the target
plays in the machinery of the adversary’s war efforts; (4) The existence of
“sensitive sites” surrounding the target;206 (5) The military advantage to be
gained from attacking the target; and (6) The expected incidental harm to
civilians and civilians object from such an attack.207
Much of this intelligence will be collected and collated in peacetime.208
This information will be stored in military archives in order to ensure opera-
tional readiness and in preparation for a prospective war. In Israeli military
jargon, for example, these archives are often referred to as “target banks,”
and they contain “targeting cards” for each individual target.209 To guaran-
tee that the information remains accurate, these cards are routinely in-
spected, reviewed, and updated on the basis of new intelligence.210
What is reflected in the above analysis is the idea that the principal pil-
lars of IHL—distinction, necessity, proportionality, humanity, and precau-
tions in attack—heavily depend on a supporting beam, that of an adequate,
sufficient, and reliable stream of intelligence information that is collected
206. These would be objects that receive special protections under IHL. See, e.g., Strobe Talbot, Letter
of Submittal, Message from the President Transmitting the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention
(May 12, 1998), https://perma.cc/UQS2-H42S.
207. As the principle of proportionality dictates, any expected civilian harms must not be excessive in
relation to the military advantage anticipated. API, supra note 202, at art. 51(5)(b). R
208. See, e.g., H.B. Keightley, Air Powers Studies Centre, Intelligence Support for Air
Operations 12–13, 22 (1996).
209. On the use of “target cards,” see The 2014 Gaza Conflict (7 July – 26 August 2014):
Factual and Legal Aspects, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ¶ 246 (May 2015), https://
perma.cc/PL6S-XZD8.
210. Id.
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and maintained in peacetime. The wartime “license to kill” thus requires a
derivative – and quite unusual211 – peacetime extension.
III. The Nature of the JUS AD Explorationem
One of the most common challenges raised by scholars as to why custom-
ary law cannot materialize in the context of espionage, concerns the fact that
the “vast majority of States both decry it and practice it.”212 As explained by
Buchan, when challenged about their espionage activities, states “over-
whelmingly refuse to admit responsibility for this conduct, let alone at-
tempt to justify it as permissible under international law.”213
The common claim is thus that state practice and opinio juris are running
in opposite directions.214 Yes, we all spy, but we all refuse to acknowledge
it, further criminalizing spying domestically and pushing against the prac-
tice when done against us. There is, therefore, no sense of a legal right asso-
ciated with the practice, but rather a sense of a legal wrong. This, however,
is a false characterization and the result of a misunderstanding as to the
nature and scope of the “right to spy.”
A. On Hohfeldian Claim Rights and Liberty Rights
Newcomb Hohfeld, in his seminal work Fundamental Legal Conceptions,
introduced the distinction between claim rights and liberty rights as put
forward by Wesley. In one of the footnotes in the book Hohfeld engages in a
conversation with Sir Fredrick Pollock’s prior writing in his volume Jurispru-
dence on the meaning of rights. According to Pollock, Hohfeld says, a “lib-
erty” is only a right “in the popular and rudimentary sense of not being
forbidden.”215 Hohfeld then proceeds to respond to Pollock’s claims: “It is
difficult to see, however, why, as between X and Y, the ‘privilege + no
right’ situation is not just as real a jural relation as the precisely opposite
‘duty + right’ relation between any two parties.” Hohfeld ponders that
perhaps the reason for our habit of recognizing only the latter as a jural
211. For more on the need for a theoretical separation between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello, see
Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus Ad Bellum Override Jus In Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the two Bodies of Law,
90 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 963 (2008).
212. See Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1072. R
213. Russell Buchan, The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage, in Interna-
tional Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy & Industry Perspectives 65, 84 (Anna-Maria Osula & Henry
Rõigas eds., 2016).
214. Id.
215. Welsey Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 48 n.59 (Walter Wheeler
Cook ed., 2003). Elsewhere on the same page, Hohfeld cites the opinion of Cave J in Allen v. Flood, a
leading case in English tort law. Cave wrote the following: “[I]t was said that a man has a perfect right to
fire off a gun, when all that was meant, apparently, was that a man has a freedom or liberty to fire off a
gun, so long as he does not violate or infringe any one’s rights in doing so, which is a very different thing
from a right, the violation or disturbance of which can be remedied or prevented by legal process.” Id. at
48.
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relationship is found in “traditional tendency to think of the law as consist-
ing of “commands,” or imperative rules.” He then clarifies the fallacy, not-
ing that “[a] rule of law that permits is just as real as a rule of law that
forbids.” 216In simple terms liberty is thus merely an absence of a duty to
abstain from action, and therefore the person against whom the liberty is
held has a “no-right” concerning the action in question. On the other hand,
that very person also has a liberty right of his own – to interfere in the
activity.
Lazarev employs the imagery of a smoking neighbor to explain the value
of “liberty rights” and the elegance of Hohfeld’s analysis. Lazarev describes
meeting a smoking neighbor (S) in the street. When Lazarev asks the man to
stop, S responds that he has a ‘right’ to smoke, as there is no legal prohibi-
tion forbidding said smoking. Lazarev notes that in this context “S is con-
fusing his entitlement. He does not have a right (in the Hohfeldian sense) to
smoke, but merely a liberty (a weaker right).”217 At the same time Lazarev
also has a liberty, to impede on his neighbor’s smoking, “by raising [his]
voice or encouraging other people to make fun of S for his smoking habit,
which may make him stop.”218 As Lazarev concludes, Hohfeld provided us
with a “precise vocabulary” for understanding everyday jural relationships.
“Had it not been for Hohfeld . . . S would mistake his liberty for a right,
and accordingly would be unable to accurately report the effect of his
entitlement.”219
B. Spying as a Liberty Right
Scholars who reject the existence of a sovereign right to spy under cus-
tomary international law, much like the smoker at the end of Lazarev’s story,
mistake a liberty for a hard claim right. They see the world from Sir Pol-
lock’s perspective: States either have a right to spy which would impose a
duty to respect that right on third parties, or they have nothing – there can
be no middle ground. Instead one might conceive of spying much like
smoking. I have a weaker liberty right to spy in your territory, but that
right doesn’t create a duty on you to suffer the asphyxiating vapors of my
surveillance. In fact, you have the liberty to interfere with my spying by
engaging in counter-espionage operations, enacting legislation, bringing
criminal proceedings against my spies, or taking retaliatory diplomatic mea-
sures – declaring my diplomats persona non grata.
216. Id.
217. Nikolai Lazarev, Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a Conceptual and Practical
Understanding of the Nature of Rights, Muruejl (2005), https://perma.cc/579X-HUD9.
218. Id.
219. Id. Another common imagery provided is that of a race. Person X has the liberty to win the race.
Nobody has a claim-right against X winning the race but, at the same time, nobody has a duty to let X
win the race. Quite the opposite, the other racers have a liberty to do everything they can (within the
rules of the race) to prevent X from winning.
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Introducing the concept of “liberty rights” opens the door for custom
around espionage to evolve as it helps fulfil the elements required for the
identification of custom. Indeed as of current state of drafting, consensus
seems to be building at the ILC around a definition of opinio juris as encom-
passing a “sense of a legal right or obligation.”220 If a sense of a legal right
makes for opinio juris, then articulating States’ entitlement as a type of right
becomes foundational for achieving those customary modifications that the
ICJ described. Currently intelligence agencies, and the governments that
control them, lack the “precise vocabulary” for explaining their interna-
tional jural nature to the general public. Nonetheless, one should not equate
a lack of proper vocabulary with a lack of actual opinio juris.221
Recall the Obama-Merkel spying scandal of 2013. When German Chan-
cellor Merkel learned of the fact that the U.S. was monitoring her communi-
cations, she expelled a top U.S. official from the embassy in Berlin, stating
in a press conference that “Spying among friends — that is simply not
done.”222 She then joined hands with Brazil (whose leader was too a victim
of American surveillance) to pass a U.N. General Assembly Resolution pro-
tecting the right to privacy in the digital age in the face of mass surveil-
lance.223 As readers of spy novels know all too well, it was only a matter of
time before the other shoe dropped. Two years later it was revealed that the
German foreign intelligence agency (BND), at the request of the NSA,
surveilled European ministries, institutions, and corporations.224 Even the
pope was not immune from BND’s spying, nor were charities like Oxfam.225
220. See Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, Fifth Rep. on Identification of Cus-
tomary Int’l Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/717, ¶¶ 73, 76–77 (Mar. 14, 2018). Note that the United States
“suggested that the express reference to the concept of a legal right in the definition of acceptance as law
should be omitted.” It claimed that this would prove “potentially confusing” because it would give the
false impression that States might be required “to establish opinio juris or that a general and consistent
practice of States support an action as lawful, before they can lawfully engage in a practice that is not
otherwise legally restricted.” Id. at ¶ 73 n.207.
221. Cf. Navarrette and Buchan, supra note 62, at 942 (suggesting that “most States may be moti- R
vated to spy for their own benefit, but reluctant to see these benefits generalized to more powerful
peers.” Navarrette and Buchan therefore conclude “there is a lack of opinio juris on espionage.” But
instead it could be that States lacking the necessary Hohfeldian vocabulary are struggling to articulate
their unique jural relationship with a spying state. It is not that they are “reluctant” to recognize the
customary nature of spying, it is that they are refusing to accept that such spying could be legitimized
when done unto them, and that is precisely what they are expected to do in the Hohfeldian sense of
spying as a liberty right or privilege).
222. See, e.g., Philip Oltermann & Spencer Ackerman, Germany Asks Top US Intelligence Official to Leave
Country Over Spy Row, The Guardian (July 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/KL4S-FDFS; Bruno Waterfield,
Christopher Hope, & Raf Sanchez, Angela Merkel: Spying Between Friends is Unacceptable, The Telegraph
(Oct. 24, 2013), https://perma.cc/4KDA-VDRB.
223. See, e.g., Katitza Rodriguez, Brazil and Germany Proposed UN Resolution Against Mass Surveillance,
Electronic Frontier Found. (Nov. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/U9ZE-U73E.
224. See, e.g., Alison Smale, Germany, Too, Is Accused of Spying on Friends, N.Y. Times (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://perma.cc/E6LT-2N7N.
225. See, e.g., Janet Mines and Stephen Brown, Germany Spied on Friends, Allies and the Vatican, Polit-
ico (Nov. 8, 2015), https://perma.cc/BL4L-DTR7.
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For those who argue against the law of espionage as a lex specialis custom-
ary subfield of international law, this episode offers the perfect example of
the cynicism that surrounds the practice. However, one can alternatively
suggest that these events reflect the custom at its finest. The US exercised
its liberty right to spy on Germany until such time as the operations were
exposed, at which point Germany, as if on cue, began heckling America
(like Lazarev did in the smoker story). Later it was Germany’s exercise of her
liberty right to spy that was exposed, and in turn, it was her European allies
who were lampooning her. Explaining espionage law and practice in this
way helps “accurately report the effect of [the] entitlement” and also the
limits of the right. It also proves that state practice and opinio juris do in fact
go in tandem, as opposed to the position held by certain relativist accounts
above discussed (supra Section II.C.). All countries spy, and all countries
legislate against spying done unto them, and that makes perfect sense
within a liberty right framework. In keeping their spying the subject of
plausible deniability states engage in a clever dance: the “spy block tango.”
By doing so, they tacitly accept the rules of the game, a set of “unexpressed
but generally accepted norms and expectations.”226
To my knowledge, the only other scholar to suggest thinking of spying
through Hohfeldian lenses was Professor Chesterman.227 In a single para-
graph in his 2006 Article “The Spy Who Came in From the Cold”––one that
hasn’t been picked up in the literature since––Chesterman shows how
through bilateral and multilateral treaties we might be able to turn the
liberty right to spy into a claim right or alternatively be able to prohibit
spying. After citing the provisions on “national technical means of verifica-
tion” from both the ABM and SALT I reciprocal spying regimes, Ches-
terman writes:
These provisions effectively establish a right to collect intelli-
gence, at least with respect to assessing compliance with the arms
control obligations. . . It then prohibits interference with such
activities and limits concealment from them. Drawing on Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld’s analytical approach to rights, this amounts
to a claim-right (or a “right” stricto sensu) for state A to collect
intelligence on state B’s compliance, as state B is under a corre-
sponding duty not to interfere with state A’s actions. This may be
contrasted with the treatment of spies in the laws of war . . .
226. Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. Rev.
217, 226 (1999).
227. In a 2006 article on the ethics of torture, Professor Fritz Allhoff had a footnote reference to
Hohfeld’s categories of rights, though the analysis there was far more limited to the question of the
relationship between the torturer and the tortured and did not address interstate relations. See Fritz
Allhoff, Ethical Defense of Torture in Interrogation, in Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelli-
gence Professional 126, 138 n.9 (Jan Goldman ed., 2006). See infra note 230, at 45 for another R
scholar, Ronald E. Watson, referring to Hohfeld in his analysis of espionage regulation, though his
engagement with Hohfeld is far from clear.
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where state A may have a liberty to use spies – state B is unable to
demand that A refrain from using spies but is not prevented from
interfering in their activities.228
Following Chesterman’s logic we can argue that the Treaty on Open
Skies, discussed above, is a multilateral treaty that turns the liberty right to
spy into a claim right, whereas the infamous “No Spy Agreement” that
allegedly exists between the 5-Eyes member states,229 turns the liberty right
to spy into a no right. In other words, through contracting we may be able
to change the reciprocal expectations and affirm a new jural relationship
between spy and spied.
Note that the liberty right conceptualization of governmental surveillance
applies only at the interstate level, not the intrastate. The Hohfeldian theory
of liberty rights – the notion that one has a “liberty” to do X, when one has
a “no duty” not to do X – while useful in the foreign surveillance context,
doesn’t extend to domestic surveillance activities where certain constitu-
tional and administrative constraints apply as to the power of the state to
surveil its own nationals. Those domestic constraints make it so that the
government can no longer claim to have a liberty, rather it has a “no
right.”230
IV. The Limits of the JUS AD Explorationem
Recognizing the existence of the right to spy is an important first step
towards regulation, as it opens the door for possible limitations introduced
through the doctrine of abuse of rights. The doctrine has its origins in ca-
nonical Roman law. The legal maxim “neminem laedit qui suo jure utitur, es-
228. See Chesterman, supra note 4, at 1091. R
229. The 5-Eyes is an intelligence alliance encompassing the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. For further reading on the alliance, see, e.g., Andrew O’Neil, Austra-
lia and the ‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence Network: the Perils of an Asymmetric Alliance, 71 Aust. J. Int’l. Aff. 529
(2017). An arrangement for no-spying is allegedly contained within the UKUSA arrangement that binds
the 5-Eyes Member States. Kady O’Malley, From the Order Paper Question Archives: Do the “Five Eyes” Watch
Each Other?, CBC News (October 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/WL4F-MNQK. But cf. Zeke J. Miller,
Obama: “There’s No Country Where We Have a No-Spy Agreement,” Time Magazine (Feb. 11, 2014), https://
perma.cc/5UCS-E36W.
230. Ronald Edward Watson, Spying: A Normative Account of the Second Oldest Profession (May
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis) ,  https://perma.cc/27MX-
R4YM (suggesting that countries have no “liberty (in the Hohfeldian sense) to spy,” Watson relies only
on a domestic surveillance example: “[Y]ou spot a police officer furtively peering through your neigh-
bor’s window. You approach the officer and you ask her why she is secretly investigating your neighbor.
She shrugs and says “you can’t prevent crimes you don’t know about.” Most people would conclude (on
the assumption that the officer is sincere) that her spying is wrong since she has no good reason for it.
Peering into the windows of more or less randomly chosen people is unlikely to prevent crime – at least
not efficiently.”). Watson’s intuition only holds water in the domestic context. If the Officer was an
American NSA agent and the peering was done through the telecommunications networks of Saudi
Arabia I doubt most would similarly conclude “the spying is wrong.”
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tablishes that nobody may harm another in exercising their rights.”231 The
doctrine has since been established as a general principle of international
law,232 and is commonly cited in the writings of publicists and early cases of
the PCIJ.233
Professor Kiss suggested that in inter-state relations “the concept of abuse
of rights may arise in three distinct legal situations.”234 For the purposes of
this paper let me just address the first of these categories,235 concerning
situations where Country A exercises its right intentionally “for an end
which is different from that for which the right has been created, with the
result that injury is caused.”236 This situation echoes the well-established
concept of détournement de pouvoir (misuse of powers) in administrative law.237
Of course, an evidentiary difficulty arises in proving state “intention.” As
noted by G.D.S. Taylor, the necessary first step in the establishment of an
abuse of rights, is our ability to “ascertain the decision-maker’s reasons. He
may actually state them, or, alternatively, his failure to state them may be an
abuse of right.”238 And where the reasons are not stated, continues Taylor,
“they must be inferred from the surrounding facts.”239 The PCIJ had further
clarified in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia that any abuse of
rights “cannot be presumed, and it rests with the party who states that there
has been such misuse to prove its statement.”240 I will return to these evi-
dentiary challenges later in my analysis. For now, suffice to say that the
doctrine introduces a basic necessity requirement whereby a country is
banned from exercising a right for a purpose not authorized by the interna-
tional community in the formation of the right.241
231. Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law ¶ 4 (2006).
232. See, e.g., Brownlie’s Principles of International Law 562 (James Crawford ed., 8th ed.
2012); Oppenheim’s International Law 407–09 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 1992);
Kotuby & Sobota, supra note 134, at 107–14. R
233. Fourth Report on State Responsibility by Mr. F.V. Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur, [1959] 2 Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm’n 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/119, at http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_
cn4_119.pdf
234. Kiss, supra note 231, at ¶ 5. R
235. The second category concerns cases where Country A exercises a right in such a way that hinders
Country B’s ability to enjoy its own rights and, as a consequence, Country B suffers an injury. Id. These
cases involve “bad faith” or “an intention to do harm.” They are thus distinguishable from the third
category of cases whereby the reckless exercise of the rights of one State, causes injury to other States. Id.
at ¶ 6. While both these categories might have relevance for the purposes of the analysis of the JAE and
JIE, I will constrain myself only to the first category for reasons of succinctness.
236. Id., at ¶ 5; see also Garcia’s Report, supra note 233, at 8 (citing R. L. Bindschedler, La Protection R
de la Propriete Privee en Droit International Prive, 90 Recueil Des Cours De L’Academie De Droit
International 212–13 (1958)).
237. See, e.g., Robert Kolb, Good Faith in International Law 170–72 (2014).
238. G.D.S. Taylor, The Content of the Rule Against Abuse of Rights in International Law 46 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l l. 323, 331 (1972–73).
239. Id. at 332.
240. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 7, at 30 (May 25).
241. Cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the Interna-
tional Court 164 (1958) (suggesting that the abuse of rights doctrine places “considerable power, not
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Crawford identifies one set of cases where the doctrine of abuse of rights
should be most frequently utilized. These are cases where the doctrine “rep-
resents a plea for legislation or the modification of rules to suit special cir-
cumstances.”242 Indeed, abuse of rights is a classic general principle in the
sense that its primary function is to clarify standards in the law and by
doing so push forward the rule-making processes of our international sys-
tem. It is truly, one of the “bees of law” as Robert Kolb once described
general principles.243 Given that the law on espionage is filled with a myriad
of legal gaps, and that it is unlikely that a rule-based system will emerge
organically through treaty or custom, this field of inter-State activity be-
comes most ripe for elucidation through the use of a general principles the
like of abuse of rights.
A. Just Causes for Spying
The right to spy is a weaker liberty right, in part because it is only a
derivative of harder claim-rights (for example, the rights of states for sur-
vival and individual and collective self-defense, above discussed).244 In their
book, The Internationalists, Professors Shapiro and Hathaway describe the
shift that occurred in the international legal order from the days of Grotius
to the days of Luaterphacht. From a world order centered around a privilege
to use force, where “might made right,” to a new world order centered
around a prohibition on the use of force. They describe this new order as a
“photo negative of the Old World Order.”245 To the extent that the right to
spy is a derivative of the right to self-defense, we should expect to see it
morphed as part of Shapiro and Hathaway’s “photo negative.” I put to you,
that the right to spy had evolved in the post-Charter era. We witnessed a
dual shift around interstate peacetime spying, both an expansion in utiliza-
tion and a simultaneous imposition of a limit on the scope of circumstances
justifying the operation.
devoid of legislative character, in the hands of a judicial tribunal.” Lauterpacht thus suggests that, as a
legal instrument the doctrine “must be wielded with studied restraint.”).
242. See Brownlie’s Principles of International Law, supra note 232, at 562. R
243. Robert Kolb, Principles as Sources of International Law, 53 Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 1, 27
(2006).
244. The idea that state rights might be derived from other rights, when the former are necessary to
operationalize the latter, is not new. For example, in the Provisional Measures Order in Timor Leste v.
Australia, the ICJ accepted the idea that States enjoyed a right to communicate with their counsel in a
confidential manner over “issues forming the subject-matter of pending arbitral proceedings and future
negotiations between the parties.” See Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and
Data, Timor-Leste v. Austl., Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 167, ¶
27 (Mar. 3). The Court reasoned the existence of such a right on the fact that it “might be derived from
the principle of the sovereign equality of States.” Id. In other words, the Court identified the existence of
an attorney-client privilege based on the fact that it was necessary for the operationalization of the claim
right to sovereign equality. See Id.
245. See Oona A. Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalist: How a Radical
Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World  97, 304 (2017).
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On the one hand, certainly the prohibition on the use of force carried with
it a move towards greater reliance on espionage. If in the past force was used
to ensure that one’s neighbors were complying with their international obli-
gations, once that power was revoked, spying became the new pressure
valve.246 Anecdotally, one can certainly cite to the Cold War as proof of the
intensification of spying in the post-Charter era. As La-Carré had noted, it
was a period in which individuals:
were being shadowed, their phones were being tapped, their cars
and houses bugged, neighbors suborned. Their letters were arriv-
ing a day late, their husbands, wives, and lovers were reporting on
them, they couldn’t park their cars without getting a ticket. The
taxman was after them and there were men who didn’t look at all
like real workmen doing something to the drains outside the
house, they’d be loitering there all week and achieved nothing.247
However, at the same time, the prohibition on the use of force and the
erection of the new Charter-based international security system reshaped
states’ expectations, by limiting tolerable spying to a specific set of justifica-
tions and use restrictions. The Cold War period was also the time where
these expectations got tested, perfected, and solidified.248
Under the new world order, one centered around a prohibition on the use
of force with self-defense being a limited exception, there are only two possi-
ble ways to justify acts of peacetime espionage (or two Just Causes to borrow
language from JWT): the advancement of national security or the advance-
ment of international security (and thereby of international peace and stabil-
ity). Both of these justifications were echoed in a speech made by President
Eisenhower in the wake of the U-2 spy planes incident, a watershed moment
for the crystallization of the international right to spy. In that speech Eisen-
hower claimed that to avoid another Pearl Harbor, a surprise attack, requires
knowledge. Ensuring “the safety of the whole free world” and allowing the
United States to “make effective preparations for defense” justified Eisen-
hower’s issuance of “directives to gather, in every feasible way, the informa-
tion required.”249
246. This was echoed by Baker, “Where verification and assurance measures may not illuminate
noncompliance with a treaty until it is too late to remedy the derogation, espionage allows for real-time
detection of violators . . . espionage encourages and enables international security agreements that parties
would otherwise be hesitant to broker.” See Baker, supra note 49, at 1110, 1112. R
247. John le Carré, The Pigeon Tunnel: Stories From My Life 165–66 (2016).
248. Joseph R. Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Characterization and Possible Utilization for
Peacekeeping, 13(3) McGill L. J. 458, 471–72 (1964) (discussing the Soviet “Danger Theory” which
suggested that any foreign spying on the Soviet Union regardless of whether it is taking place from
within or outside Soviet territory constituted an endangerment of Soviet interests and therefore a viola-
tion of its sovereignty. This theory was floated in the wake of the U-2 spy plane incident and MIDAS,
only to be ultimately rejected with the adoption of SALT I and ABM, both solidifying the notion that
spying to ensure compliance with disarmament regimes was acceptable).
249. See, e.g., Felix Belair Jr., President Asserts Secrecy of Soviets Justifies Spying, N.Y. Times, (May 12,
1960), https://perma.cc/J98U-QXKP.
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Baker, summarizing the writing of Reisman on the topic, identified three
goals for the intelligence function in our global order: (1) intelligence
should inform decision; (2) intelligence should offer a source of stability in
maintaining international public order; and (3) intelligence should guard
against surprise.250 I agree with Baker and Reisman’s analysis. That said, the
fact that intelligence should inform decision is a misnomer for our purposes,
for the question is what kind of decisions should it inform? The second and
third goals answer that question. Intelligence should only inform those deci-
sions necessary to guard against surprise or to increase international stabil-
ity. Let us examine both of these justifications closely.
1. National Security
The first basis for the right to spy derives its legitimacy from the individ-
ual states – a bottom-up model grounded in self-preservation. What are the
limits of this justification? Surely the term national security should not to
be confused with a “Garrison State,”251 some Machiavellian notion of power
maintenance. If we merely accepted as fact that princes truly had “no other
aim or consideration, nor seek to develop any other vocation outside war, the
organization of the army and military discipline,”252 then any act of govern-
ment could potentially be painted with broad national security brushes and
trumped up to the march of the cavalry.253 In other words, an overtly expan-
sive theory of national security will result in the concept drawing more and
more matter inwards to the center of the mass, contracting beyond that
which it can carry. It will inevitably lead to a gravitational collapse where
the very justification could no longer serve its purpose.
Instead, espionage operations that serve national security interests should
be understood to mean those operations that are directly linked to threats to
the polity. Those are potential dangers to the Charter values of territorial
integrity and political independence. In this sense national security is distin-
guished from mere “national interests,” and even more clearly it is to be
distinguished from “the interests of some nationals.”254
At the same time the term cannot be so restrictive as to only apply to
information necessary “to prevent organised violent attacks that are moti-
vated by a political, ideological or religious cause, and that are so serious
that they require a national response, normally involving military action.”255
250. See Baker, supra note 111, at 76. R
251. Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46(4) Am. J. Soc. 455, 455 (1941) (discussing a world of
“garrison states” in which the specialists of violence are the most powerful group in society).
252. Machiavelli, supra note 46, at 57. R
253. See also Hobbes, supra note 39, at 27 (deriving from the right of “self-preservation,” a corollary R
right “to use any means and do any action” to achieve such preservation).
254. See Tony Pfaff, Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground: The Ethics of Espionage in the Modern Age,
in 1 Ethics of Spying, supra note 45, at 98. R
255. Toby Mendel, Defining the Scope of National Security: Issues Paper for the National Security Principles
Project, Centre for Law and Democracy 12 (Mar. 2013), https://perma.cc/M7XB-MU3D.
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This definition of national security, adopted by the Centre for Law and De-
mocracy, is too restrictive to be applied as a broader test for the ILI, as it
will significantly limit the ability of states to engage many of the legitimate
operations which they conduct today in the name of protecting their nation-
als. Consider, for example, less articulable threats (“unknown unknowns”)256
that intelligence agencies are tasked with thwarting within the foggy envi-
ronment of foreign espionage.257
Instead of binary definitions, it might be better to consider national se-
curity on a spectrum, where there will be cases clearly falling within the core
national security interests of the state, cases that clearly fall outside that
definition, and a lot of grey area in the middle. Spying on the military
capabilities of an adversary would surely be considered an act in the service
of national security. Spying to advance the economic interests of one’s tour-
ism industry should surely be considered outside that scope. Close call cases
would involve spying for the purpose of advancing the foreign affairs inter-
ests of the state, or certain forms of economic espionage necessary to protect
a state’s economic well-being.258
The national security test thus inevitably introduces grey zones where
rule-appliers are likely to face significant hurdles in reaching consensus over
the drawing of legal limits, and as a result rule-abusers will see an opening
to exploit the system for their own immediate gains. This fact, however,
should not deter us. After all, we are accustomed in international law to
such standards and have learned to deal with their ambiguity. Consider the
principle of proportionality under the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols. In applying the principle, a small group of test cases might easily
and conclusively be determined as proportionate or disproportionate, but
then there is a large middle group of “close cases” where (to paraphrase the
ICTY’s Expert Committee) not even two military commanders, with differ-
ent doctrinal background, could reach consensus.259
I therefore wish not to make any categorical determinations as to whether
an espionage operation that is aimed at advancing a “grey area” interest
could be said to result ipso facto in an abuse of the right to spy. This will
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the de-
gree to which the surveilling state’s needs could be articulated in national
security terms. For those who believe that introducing such a national secur-
256. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002, 11:30 AM), https:/
/perma.cc/T5ZP-2DCM.
257. For a discussion of the need for greater leniency in applying the principle of necessity in the
foreign surveillance context, see generally Asaf Lubin, “We Only Spy on Foreigners”: The Myth of a Universal
Right to Privacy and the Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance, 18 Chi. J. Int’l. L. 502 (2018).
258. Note in this regard that, for example, both the German and the French foreign surveillance
legislation expressly authorize the collection of intelligence for the purposes of advancing foreign policies.
For further reading, see Asaf Lubin, A New Era of Mass Surveillance is Emerging Across Europe, Just Secur-
ity (Jan. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/48WU-M7FQ.
259. ICTY’s Expert Report, supra note 205, at ¶ 50. R
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ity test into the ILI would result in exploitation of the term by intelligence
agencies to a point of collapse, one need only cite the domestic foreign sur-
veillance laws of certain countries who have already put the test into statu-
tory language. Take as only one example the Swedish Signals Intelligence
Act. The Act establishes eight possible justifications for foreign SIGINT
collection in Section 1(2), which may be summarized in the following way:
(1) military threats; (2) threats to international peacekeeping or humanita-
rian missions; (3) international terrorism and cross-border crimes; (4) the
development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and similar
military equipment; (5) threats to society’s infrastructures; (6) foreign con-
flicts with consequences for international security; (7) counter-espionage; (8)
foreign actions and intentions of importance to Swedish foreign, security, or
defense policy.260
Here you have it. A country has successfully managed to translate the
term “national security” into a specific set of eight well-articulable and rea-
soned categories of legitimate spying. It is true that certain operations under
categories 5 and 8 might fall into the “gray area” in our above spectrum by
pulling away from core national security concerns. That, however, does not
entail a collapse of the JAE system as a possible constraint on peacetime
espionage.
2. International Stability and Cooperation
The second justification for the right to spy garners its support from the
structures of our international system as a whole – a top-bottom model
grounded in the functions that intelligence plays in our public world order.
For an operation to meet this test, it must be in the service of the raison d’être
of the system, the fundamental goals of all law: “the minimization of vio-
lence, the maintenance of minimum order, and as approximate an achieve-
ment of the policies of human dignity as each situation allows.”261 Examples
of such spying operations have been already discussed above, and may in-
clude inter alia the gathering and sharing of intelligence with the U.N. Se-
curity Council prior to a vote authorizing the use of force, collection efforts
in relation to counter-proliferation, arms control and sanctions regimes, sup-
porting blue helmets with information about threats to the forces, and as-
sisting investigations by international courts, tribunals, and fact-finding
missions.
Both national security and international security, as the two justifications
of espionage, are of equal strength, and often their application will converge.
If Germany were to launch a surveillance operation on DPRK’s nuclear pro-
260. See supra note 198 (summarizing the Swedish law).
261. W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment: Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 Am. J.
Int’l. L. 82, 83 (2003); see also W. Michael Reisman, The Quest for World Order and Human
Dignity in the Twenty-First Century: Constitutive Process and Individual Commitment
442–45 (2012).
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gram, such an operation would be justified both in the protection of the
national security of Germany and in service of broader international
stability.
At the same time when the U.S. and the U.K. spy on every member of
the Security Council in the lead up to the vote authorizing the use of force
on Iraq,262 such spying might serve the national security interests of those
states but run counter to the interests of the international community in
maintaining an independent and impartial collective security system. Such
an operation should be cautioned but nonetheless tolerated because it con-
tinues to serve at least one of the two legitimizing rationales.
B. The Application of the Just Causes
By recognizing that a liberty right to spy exists as a matter of customary
international law, the international community inexplicitly created a caveat
to the myth system. Countries are willing to accept as tolerable certain as-
saults on their territorial sovereignty, their jurisdiction to determine their
domestic affairs, as well as their and their officials’ immunities and privi-
leges, in the name of maintaining the important functions that intelligence
plays in public life.263
This entails that the relativist accounts that link legality and illegality to
territoriality or to certain privileges to which the targets of surveillance are
entitled, are adopting the wrong standard. Instead, those operations which
serve one of the two legitimizing aims (JAE) and which operate within gen-
erally agreeable bounds of action (JIE), regardless of their geography or
questions of immunity, will be stomached even by those who have been
discontentedly subjected to them. The Israeli Mossad operation in Teheran,
above discussed, offers one such example.
C. Unjust Causes for Spying
It follows from our analysis until now that those practices that serve
neither national security interests nor the interests of the international com-
munity writ large should be considered an abuse of the right to spy and
therefore condemned. As I have already alluded to, such an analysis will be
directly dependent on questions of intentionality.264
Spying is thus not malum in se, rather our motivating purpose in the col-
lection of intelligence will determine legality distinguishing right from
wrong. The lawfulness of an intelligence gathering operation, as a derivative
right, depends on its source. We can thus think of the right to spy as a river
of legal permissibility. So long as the river’s floodgates stay open, the water
262. See Bright & Beaumont, supra note 86 and accompanying text. R
263. Recall that this position was suggested by a minority of the experts in Tallinn Manual 2.0. See
TM 2.0, supra note 12, at 19; see also Schmitt, supra note 104, at 5 n.28. R
264. See Baker, supra note 49, at 1097; see also Falk, supra note 10, at 58. R
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flows downstream; but when the gates are shut, the water downstream dries
up. When the purpose of spying is legal, the river’s gates open, and the
derivative, downstream, right of spying likewise becomes available. But
when the purpose of spying is illegal, it is like leaving the gates shut; the
river of permissibility is blocked up, the water dries out, the downstream
right to spy is lost as is the action’s legality.
Below I have identified, what I believe to be, the four most salient catego-
ries of ends which fall outside the permissive structures, and therefore
should not be tolerated by the international community. This is not an ex-
haustive list but one that, so it is hoped, could allow others to continue the
conversation as to legal line drawing. I invite future scholars to both expand
on the categories in this list and add new categories in light of their observa-
tions of the law and practice.
1. Spying as a Means to Advance Personal Interests
In November 2017 the Prague 1 District Court sentenced Jana Nagyová
to two years in prison for a “misuse of intelligence” and “abuse of
power.”265 Dubbed by the media as the Czech “femme fatale”266 she was
convicted for her involvement in a national spy scandal worthy of a bestsel-
ling novel. According to the indictment, in 2012 while serving as the Chief
of Staff to then Prime Minister Petr Neèas, the two began a romantic affair,
all behind the back of the latter’s wife, his high-school sweetheart Radka
Neèasová. In an attempt to speed the divorce Nagyová ordered the Czech
Republic’s military intelligence to gather damning information about the
wife, arguing unconvincingly that spying on the home of the PM was neces-
sary to thwart threats to his personal safety. Furthermore, to keep the affair
under wraps she ordered the military to spy on a number of governmental
employees, including the PM’s personal driver.267 In June 2013 Nagyová
was arrested alongside eight other individuals, including the three intelli-
gence officials who carried out her orders. The scandal triggered a political
firestorm that forced PM Neèas to resign.
The Nagyová scandal concerns violations of many domestic laws. None-
theless, under my analysis of the JAE, these acts would also trigger a sepa-
rate violation of international law (to the extent that any of the spying was
carried out outside the territory of the Czech Republic). The operation was
launched not to advance the national security of the Czech Republic nor in
the service of international peace and stability. Rather national resources
265. See Dominik Jùn, Guilty Verdict in Case that Brought Down Neèas Government, Radio Praha, (Nov.
23, 2017), https://perma.cc/6MVC-3DJG.
266. See Court Finds Czech ‘Femme Fatale’ Guilty in Spy Scandal, The Jakarta Post, (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://perma.cc/YK2J-YVYE.
267. See Czech ex-PM’s Mistress Guilty of Setting Spies on Love Rival, BBC, (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
perma.cc/LB2S-HCUM.
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were devoted towards the gathering of intelligence for the purpose of ad-
vancing personal interests of a particular political figure.
Calling such a behavior an international delinquency will thus follow in
the footsteps of the gradual criminalization at the international level of other
self-serving acts by government officials, such as bribery and corruption.268
The reason behind this prohibition is rooted in an understanding that the
right to spy belongs to the state, to the polity, not to any particular ruling
elite.269
2. Spying as a Means to Commit an Internationally Wrongful Act
On the night of February 22–23, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin
met with his security services chiefs to discuss the extrication of deposed
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. At the end of the meeting Putin
remarked that “we must start working on returning Crimea to Russia.”
Four days after that meeting, unidentified soldiers took over the local parlia-
ment in Crimea and deputies hurriedly voted in a new government. The
Ukrainian province was formally annexed by Moscow on March 18, trigger-
ing international condemnation.270 It is safe to assume that in the days lead-
ing up to the forceful annexation, Russian intelligence agencies were
working overtime to advance Putin’s declared agenda. They had a lot of
fertile ground to operate from, as in the years leading up to the annexation
Russian intelligence gradually took control over and enlisted spies from
within the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and military intelligence in
Crimea.271 It raises the question, does an intelligence operation launched in
immediate preparation for an unlawful annexation and with the intention of
enabling such annexation, lawful under international law?
The long practiced legal doctrines of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (“from a
dishonorable cause an action does not arise”)272 and ex injuria jus non oritur
(“law does not arise from injustice”)273 both reflect a deep-seeded moral
commitment according to which “a right cannot stem from a wrong.”274
268. See generally Ilias Bantekas, Corruption as an International Crime and Crime against Humanity: An
Outline of Supplementary Criminal Justice Policies, 4 J. Int’l Crim Just. 466, 468–74 (2006); see also World
Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006).
269. See Jones, supra note 94, at 41 (“While nations may sometimes use intrusive measures to collect R
information, individuals may not. Thus, espionage as a form of acceptable statecraft would be considered
mere theft if practiced by individuals.”).
270. Agence France-Presse, Vladimir Putin Describes Secret Meeting when Russia Decided to Seize Crimea,
The Guardian, (Mar. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/CDG9-EWNA.
271. Taras Kuzio & Paul D’anieri, Annexation and Hybrid Warfare in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, E-
International Relations (June 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/F3N3-3X55.
272. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Engl. Rep. 1120, 1121, 1. Cowp. 341, 343 (1775); World Duty Free Co.
Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 179 (Oct. 4, 2006).
273. See, e.g., Gabcı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 ICJ Rep. 7 ¶ 133;
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J.
Rep. 392, 558, ¶ 268 (Nov. 26) (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
274. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, ¶
95 (Apr. 5) (separate opinion of Anzilotti, J.) (“[A]n unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at
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Our derivative right to spy necessitates an independent source that would
open the floodgates of the river of permissibility, thereby legitimizing the
inevitable harms associated with the practice. But if it is a wrongful activity
from which our spying stems, the spying will be tainted with that illegality.
Spying conducted in the immediate and necessary service of an act of aggres-
sion or annexation or in material preparation for a crime against humanity,
must itself be deemed unlawful.
Put a different way, if a specific act of espionage is a constitutive element
in a larger wrongdoing, if it is an integral and indispensable element in a
chain of events unequivocally leading to the commissioning of an interna-
tionally wrongful act, to a point where one cannot conceive of the wrongful
activity without imagining the intelligence gathering that came before it,
and if such intelligence was gathered with knowledge of and intent to com-
mit that wrongful activity, then that act of espionage must be deemed
unlawful.
Consider for example the crime of genocide. It requires a showing that
the perpetrator both “intended to destroy, in whole or in part, [a] national,
ethnical, racial or religious group” and that that perpetrator engaged in
conduct that “took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group.”275 A constitutive element of the crime
of genocide is a meticulous plan and preparation involving all of the organs
of the state, including its intelligence arm.276 Nazi Germany couldn’t exe-
cute the demonic plot to round up all the Jews and rush them onto the
death trains to the killing centers in Auschwitz, without the Sicherheit-
sdienst (SD, the intelligence arm of the SS), the criminal police, and the
Gestapo engaging in information gathering - carefully drafting intelligence
reference books and routinely listing and tallying those persons to be
amassed, herded and killed across the Reich’s Lebensraum.277 This intelli-
gence operation was thus wrongful twice over: first, because it lacked a legit-
imate source from which to derive its legality, but second (and more
egregiously), since it formed an integral part of that very illegal act.
3. Spying as a Means to Advance Corporate Interests
Following the Snowden revelations, President Obama passed Presidential
Policy Directive 28 on Signals Intelligence Activities. PPD-28 was unique
insofar as it offered “principles and doctrines of surveillance permission and
law.”). See also William Thomas Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on the Rules of International Law,
28 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 443, 447 (2013).
275. See Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, Rep. of the Preparatory Commission
for the Int’l Crim. Ct., U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, Art. 6(a) (2000).
276. See XXII Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tri-
bunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946 226 (1948) (“This plan could only be
executed by the use of the whole of the SS, of every branch of the SS working in unison and in co-
operation with each other.”).
277. Id. at 340–41, 346–47.
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restraint”278 to be applied by U.S. intelligence agencies in the course of their
routine foreign SIGINT gathering.279 PPD-28 expressly prohibited the col-
lection of intelligence for the purposes of affording “a competitive advantage
to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors.” In so doing it limited the
reliance on economic espionage only to those cases where “the collection of
private commercial information or trade secrets” is done in the service of
protecting the national security of the U.S. or its allies.280 Similarly, the
2016 German Foreign Intelligence Law prohibited the gathering of infor-
mation for the purpose of achieving “competitive advantages (industrial es-
pionage).”281 This trend is further in line with the approach laid down in
the U.S.-China “common understanding” against cyber economic espionage
adopted in 2015, as well as a similar commitment adopted by the G20 the
same year.282 The IGE further entertained the possibility of a prohibition on
economic espionage in Tallinn Manual 2.0, though ultimately failed to rec-
ognize it as a binding customary rule.283
These recent developments in state practice have led some commentators
to suggest that a new norm, albeit not a legal rule, against economically
motivated cyber espionage has emerged.284 My articulation of the right to
spy helps provide normative reasoning as to why such activities must be
condemned. Spying to advance one’s corporate competitive advantage can-
not be deemed in service of either a country’s national security or the stabil-
ity of the international community and thus lacks legitimizing authority.
As Libicki clarifies, however, this norm should not be confused with a
broader rule prohibiting all spying on commercial entities.285 Indeed, spying
on economic entities when there is an articulable national security need (e.g.
to help track terrorists who used commercial systems or to identify weakness
in those commercial systems necessary to develop new SIGINT capabilities
to exploit them) will be tolerated for the same reason that any other form of
spying to protect the nation from surprise attacks should be deemed
permissible.
278. Benjamin Wittes, The President’s Speech and PPD-28: A Guide for the Perplexed, Lawfare (Jan. 20,
2014, 11:02 AM), https://perma.cc/W6N8-4JQF.
279. Id.
280. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28—Signals In-
telligence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/LU7V-92CA. PPD-28 further clarifies that “certain
economic purposes, such as identifying trade or sanctions violations or government influence or direction,
shall not constitute competitive advantage.” Id.
281. §6(5) Gesetzzur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufkla?rung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, [Law
on Foreign telecommunications of the Federal Intelligence Service] Dec. 23, 2016, BGBI I no. 67 2016
at 3346, §6(5) (Ger.).
282. See Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage Under International
Law, 40 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 444 (2015); David Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and Interna-
tional Law: Controversies Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets through Cyber Technologies, ASIL
Insight (Mar. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/WH8U-UQLQ.
283. See TM 2.0, supra note 12, at 169 n.386. R
284. Martin Libicki, The Coming of Cyber Espionage Norms, in 9th International Conference on
Cyber Conflict 1, 2–4 (Henry Rõigas, Raik Jakschis, Lauri Lindstro?m, Tomás̆ Minárik eds., 2017).
285. Id. at 4.
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In this regard, spying on technological innovation developed by or for the
purposes of advancing a nation’s military capabilities would always be a le-
gitimate target for espionage. This was the case during World War I when
spies of opposing sides were sent to collect intelligence on the industrial and
scientific sectors of the adversary to secure information around the develop-
ment of new secret weapons systems, including certain poisonous gasses.286
4. Spying as a Means to Exploit Post-Colonial Relations
Finally, consider the Australia-Timor Leste spy scandal. In 2004 Australia
mounted a spying operation to gather information about the negotiating
positions of its poor neighboring country, Timor Leste. Australia sought to
rely on the information it collected to rob its neighbor in a treaty on gas
extractions in the seabed between the two. This was the first natural re-
source found in the territory of Timor Leste, and its extraction became stra-
tegic to the economic wellbeing of the state. To facilitate the surveillance
four operatives of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service pretended to be
aid workers sent to assist in the “renovations” of Timor Leste’s government
complex. The four then bugged the walls and phones of the prime minister’s
office and that of the entire cabinet.287
As part of a provisional measures application before the ICJ, Timor Leste
submitted a memorial which began by detailing its history of colonization,
first in the hands of the Dutch and Portuguese and later under the control of
Indonesia.288 Part of this history concerns the Timor Gap Treaty signed in
1989 between Indonesia and Australia under which both countries jointly
exploited petroleum resources in part of the Timor Sea bed. The memorial
introduces all of this on purpose to highlight what it calls a “tragic story”
and to exemplify “Australia’s role therein.”289
This exposition is important as it puts the Australian spying operation
during treaty negotiations and later seizure of certain documents from Ti-
mor-Leste’s legal counsel into context. Australia’s intelligence gathering
cannot be justified through either a substantiated claim of national security
needs nor an argument surrounding the enhancement of collective security.
Quite the opposite, Australia’s spying was a destabilizing act, serving the
286. Hedieh Nasheri, Economic Espionage and Industrial Spying 12 (2005); see also
Volkman, supra note 3, at 68–70 (discussing the development of food preservation through sterilization R
by French entrepreneur Nicholas Appert for use by the French Revolutionary Army and the theft of his
intellectual property by English spies only to be reverse engineered and mass produced to support the
British Royal Army).
287. See, e.g., Matthew Happold, East Timor Takes Australia to ICJ Over Documents Seized by Australian
Intelligence, EJIL: Talk! (Dec. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/HNR3-DRWR. The two parties have since
resolved their disputes surrounding the scandal. See Helen Davidson, Australia and Timor-Leste Sign His-
toric Maritime Border Treaty, The Guardian (Mar. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/J79K-44J9.
288. See Memorial of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste, Questions Relating to the Seizure and
Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Austl.), 2014 I.C.J. Pleadings ¶¶ 2.5–2.17
(Apr. 28, 2014).
289. See id. at ¶ 2.10.
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sole purpose of weakening an already fragile society in dire need of economic
resilience, all in the name of enrichening its treasury. Such an operation is a
direct assault against the spirit and wording of the customary 1960 Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries which affirmed
that the subjection of peoples to alien exploitation constitutes a denial of
fundamental human rights, contrary to both the U.N. Charter and the pro-
motion of peace and cooperation.290 Spying of this nature thus does not serve
the purposes for which the right to spy was introduced, and should be con-
sidered abusive.
V. Conclusion
Middleton’s A Game At Chess begins with a classic opening move, the
Queen’s Gambit Declined, in which black refuses a pawn offered by
white.291 To explain the lex specialis of the law of espionage it would perhaps
be better if we analogize to the opposite move, the Queen’s Gambit Ac-
cepted. After all this is a field of law saturated with unvoiced yet com-
munally endorsed constitutive structures, reciprocal expectations, and
essential rules of the road. Spying and the grand old game of kings and
philosophers share a thing in common, as Charles Buxton once put it: “in
life, as in chess, forethought wins.”
More than anything, I hope this article serves as a call for action, inviting
practitioners and international scholars to join the effort of thinking cre-
atively in tackling existing blind spots around the regulation of peacetime
espionage. Cicero believed that inter arma enim silent leges (in times of war the
law falls silent). A group of brave lawyers proved him wrong when they
launched the campaign to regulate war which culminated with the adoption
of the Geneva Conventions. We are now being indoctrinated into thinking
that when the spies connive the laws fall silent. It didn’t make sense at the
time of Cicero; it certainly should not make sense to us now.
In proposing a new normative framework for thinking about the interna-
tional law of intelligence, I hope to invite other scholars to further expand
on this work. The list of categories of spying that might trigger an abuse of
rights, for example, is far from exhaustive and may be expanded in light of
new realities in spycraft. Similarly, while the adoption of an Hohfeldian
liberty rights lens through which to examine the jural relations between
states is innovative, such a theory may need to be reconciled with conven-
tional accounts of how state practice and opinio juris shape the formation and
application of customary international law on espionage. Within the limits
of this piece, the paper falls short of pursuing this thread.
290. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1960).
291. Middleton, supra note 1, at 10 n.1. R
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Ultimately, this paper introduces three temporal paradigms for control-
ling espionage: Jus Ad Explorationem, Jus In Exploratione, Jus Post Explortionem.
This paper focused on only the first of these three. The two remaining para-
digms––law that governs the particular choice of means and targets in the
conduct of spying, and the law that governs attribution and accountability
regimes once spying operations have ceased or were discovered––hold the
other important pieces of the regulatory puzzle.
We should reject the forces of intellectual stagnation and speak up
against what Iñaki Navarrete aptly called the “Politics of Silence.”292 It is
indeed the responsibility of every generation of academics to push the
boundaries of the discourse that came before us, thereby challenging the
collective conceptions and misconceptions surrounding the fundamental
dogmas of our political life. The international law of intelligence should not
be immune from such scrutiny.
292. See Navarrete, supra note 62, at 17. R
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